


JPRS-UMA-94-051
7 December 1994



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

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Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-94-051

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7 December 1994

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ARMED FORCES ISSUES

Procuracy Statement on Burlakov Case

95UM0100B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 18 Nov 94 p 1

[EKHO MOSKVY Radio item: "A. Ilyushenko: General Burlakov Not Involved in Corruption in Western Group of Forces"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow—"As of today, there is no information that would confirm the involvement of General Burlakov in corruption in the Western Group of Forces," acting Procurator General Aleksey Ilyushenko told EKHO MOSKVY radio.

A. Ilyushenko said he intends to sign a letter in the coming days addressed to the chairman of the State Duma's defense committee, Sergey Yushenkov, that will set forth "specifically and in figures" what the Procuracy General and the procuracy of the Western Group of Forces have done to date to investigate instances of corruption in the Western Group of Forces. Based on documents available at this time, Gen. Burlakov was not involved in instances of corruption in the Western Group of Forces, A. Ilyushenko stressed.

Lebed Rejects Burlakov Visit to 14th Army

95UM0100A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian 6 Nov 94 p 9

[Article by Aleksandr Zhilin, under the "Viewpoint" rubric: "Generals' Duel: Deputy Defense Minister Matvey Burlakov's Attempt To Inspect 14th Army Ends in Scandal"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Last week General Aleksandr Lebed, Commander of the 14th Army, publicly stated his opinion of Russian Deputy Defense Minister Matvey Burlakov. "Burlakov is a common crook who makes every Russian procurator weep." This toughly worded statement, to put it mildly, was prompted by the deputy defense minister's attempt to pay an inspection visit to the 14th Army. Lebed added that he would not allow Burlakov to come to Tiraspol.

An instance in which an Army commander calls a deputy defense minister a thief and refuses to allow him to visit his troops is unprecedented in the history of the Russian Army. Moreover, insubordination to a superior officer in the Army can be termed mutiny. The challenge has been issued, and the conflict starkly defined: In the Army, as we know, there can be but one principle of authority—one-man command. So either the unruly Lebed must be removed or the publicly humiliated Burlakov must resign.

The conflict goes far beyond the bounds of a personality clash. Numerous sociological studies show that although the defense minister is very much in charge, Lebed is the Armed Forces' unofficial leader. And today, even Grachev's closest aides make no secret of their belief that Gen. Lebed is the defense minister's biggest headache. The two generals, who once served together, have come to symbolize two poles in the Army: On the one hand, a defense minister who has become bogged down in dubious activities that have become known thanks to the press, and on the other hand, a decisive general who is combating corruption and embezzlement of state property in the Dniester region. It is not surprising that everyone in or near the Army is closely watching to see how the confrontation unfolds.

Grachev's first attempt to rid himself of his "staff gravedigger," by "reforming" the 14th Army in August of this year was unsuccessful. And not only because Lebed's subordinates solidly backed their Army commander. Grumbling could be heard throughout the Armed Forces. The Cossack movement also voiced displeasure.

Seeing the danger of a powerful outburst of indignation, the defense minister retreated.

His second attempt—to at least discredit Lebed if he could not sack him—came last week, when an excellent move was conceived: to send scandal-plagued Deputy Minister Matvey Burlakov to the 14th Army for an inspection. One can imagine the stunning effect that television reports showing Lebed saluting and standing at attention before Burlakov would have had on the officer corps. It would have been a turning point in the Army, one that would run the risk of a total loss of faith in any change for the better whatsoever. Fully aware of this, Lebed took his decisive step.

Now, along with the conflict between the Defense Ministry leadership and society that has broken out following the murder of Dmitriy Kholodov, the conflict within the Army itself has become clearly visible. On the one hand, there is the Grachev grouping and the anti-Grachev opposition in the Defense Ministry leadership, which seeks to remove the defense minister but prevent an outsider like Lebed from replacing him; on the other hand, there is virtually the entire officer corps and the unruly general who symbolizes it.

For all practical purposes, the fate of the Russian Army hinges on the outcome of this confrontation. Either it will emerge from the crisis and go about its assigned functions of protecting the country from outside threats or it will degenerate and turn into a criminal structure that, with its communication and transportation networks, intelligence service, disinformation, special services, and so on, will pose a mortal danger to society.

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Investigation Record on Possible WGF Corruption

95UM0081B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 12 Nov 94 pp 1, 2

[Article by Ravil Zaripov: "Everyone in the Army Has His or Her Own Needs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **How much more water and money will go down such generals' toilets before thousands of homeless families of Russian officers receive the long-awaited housing?**

For 16 years the family of navyman Anatoliy Konovalov has been knocking about in someone else's quarters... One of the most successful operations by military leader Burlakov was the movement of wallpaper and sanitary engineering equipment from Berlin to Moscow.

In 1992 the Russian Federation General Procuracy under the direction of then Procurator General Valentin Stepankov began an investigation into facts of corruption and misappropriation in Western Group of Forces [WGF]. During the entire period Russian troops were present in Germany more than one commission arrived there—from the President, from the General Procuracy and Military Procuracy, from the Ministry of Finance... A special investigating team of the WGF Procuracy was working simultaneously. According to information of procuracy investigators, documents obtained in the course of the investigation were handed over to Aleksey Ilyushenko, then chief of the Control-Audit Administration under the President. He was the one who checked facts of abuse and corruption established in the course of the investigation. Ilyushenko's commission concluded that facts established by the investigating team were not confirmed.

Today Russian Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev declares to television viewers that accusations concerning corruption in the supreme military leadership were a planned act against the entire Army. Its goal was to bring down the Russian Armed Forces. And Matvey Burlakov's retirement was nothing more than a temporary respite by mutual consent. Russians were given to understand that after a little time passed the former CINC WGF would return to the office of deputy minister, to which he already had become accustomed. He would return a victor inasmuch as the accusers have no confirmed facts.

But not everything is as smooth as generals Grachev and Burlakov would like it.

One senior military procuracy official who served in WGF at that time placed at our disposal a copy of a document, a decree of 23 June 1993 signed by Colonel of Justice O. K. Sikorskiy, WGF senior assistant military procurator and chief of the investigations department, who conducted the investigation of materials of a criminal case of abuse by WGF officials in the purchase and sale of furniture, construction materials and sanitary engineering equipment.

From Investigation Materials

"On 27 May 1993 an audit based on the present criminal case was assigned to check the legality and substantiation of the purchase of furniture and other interior decoration property in WGF for FRG marks and its further sale to various persons for Soviet rubles. The audit was assigned to specialists of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Main Billeting Directorate, Main Military Budget and Finance Directorate and Russian Federation Ministry of Finance...

"In many instances scarce, expensive construction materials, tools and sanitary engineering equipment for construction and repair of so-called control sites' were purchased and sent out of WGF. An analysis of these purchases indicates they were made for purposes that were a far cry from providing the troops being withdrawn with accommodations and amenities.

"For example, four sets of bathroom equipment (including bathtubs, faience sinks, bidets, towel racks, rugs, lamps and so on) for the sum of 24,600 marks, two entry door sets (peepholes, door chains, handles, locks) for the sum of 653.4 marks, and much other costly equipment, tools, wallpaper, decorative tile and so on totalling 83,100 marks were purchased and sent to the Main Billeting Directorate and its subordinate 152nd UNR (Work Supervisor's Office—R.Z.) during 1991-1992 from funds in the settlement account of the Bezirk Dresden KECh (billeting unit—R.Z.).

"A bathroom set, two white pedestal washstands, two ball mixers for bathtubs and washstand, 12 door handles and so on were purchased and sent to the 3rd Directorate of the Ministry of Defense Main Billeting Directorate (No 147/5/83444 of 12 February 1992), and 20 pairs of brass door handles, 7 ceramic shelves for bathroom mirrors, 45 chrome bathroom hooks and 3 chrome toilet paper holders and other property were purchased and sent to vch [Military Unit] 16949 (Ministry of Defense Main Billeting Directorate Central Depot) (Outgoing No 147/5/9156 of 6 April 1992)."

WGF currency funds were supposed to be spent only on the purchase of construction materials for providing WGF troops with accommodations and amenities and building housing in Russia for servicemen being withdrawn from Germany. Meanwhile, as it appears from the document, this currency was used to purchase expensive furniture, luxurious sanitary engineering equipment and construction materials. You don't put a bidet in a barracks; on the other hand, for example, it won't hurt in the apartments of the highest Ministry of Defense officials ("or perhaps not just for the heads of this ministry," suggested the procuracy official after thinking awhile). The mechanism for concealing such purchases had been worked out rather well. In order not to pay accounts through the WGF Finance Service, some expensive materials were purchased directly in supermarkets, not from firms making deliveries to troops. If a wholesale firm, for example, was supplying bathtub mixers at 60

marks, the cost of the "luxury" class mixer in the supermarket rose to 250-400 marks. In this case the account would be paid through the Bezirk billeting unit. Thus, the WGF Finance Service could not know about purchases made by a particular billeting unit chief.

There were 21 such units on the territory of Germany; their duties included maintaining the engineering networks, barracks and housing. As troops were withdrawn, the number of billeting units also was reduced. Each unit had its own settlement account. In particular, as follows from the document, 83,000 marks worth of expensive equipment, including bathtub sets, mixers, decorative tile and wallpaper, was purchased in a short period just through the Dresden billeting unit. Subsequently it was sent to Russia, where the materials arrived at the Ministry of Defense central base and then were transferred to specific persons by decision from higher up. The destination points at which expensive construction materials and tools arrived were called "control sites." They turned out to be the apartments of highly placed officials where construction or repair was carried out.

From Investigation Materials

"For example, four each expensive mixers for bathtubs, washstands and sinks, metal hoses with a shower grid and expensive wallpaper were sent to Military Unit 16949 (Ministry of Defense Main Billeting Directorate Central Depot) under Order No 3, and 118 rolls of wallpaper at a price of from 9 to 15 marks per roll under orders Nos 5 and 9 in January 1992; and four sets of bathroom accessories at a cost of 1,414 marks each, a faience sink set costing 535.5 marks, and other property were sent under orders Nos 18 and 37 during March-April 1992."

According to rules in effect, the recipient was supposed to pay for these deliveries in currency and to transfer currency funds to the WGF settlement account. In fact, however, prices would be converted to rubles under the old Gosbank rate used for noncommercial payments. Thus, expensive furniture and sanitary engineering equipment would go almost dirt-cheap. Our source asserts that customers often did not pay money at all.

Beginning in 1990, vehicles would set off for Russia several times a month with materials from Germany. They would cross the border in the escort of a senior person, who would be issued an order for customs services and a materials pass made out in WGF Headquarters. VTA (Military-Transport Aviation, mainly Il-76's) aircraft often were used. Highly placed persons (no lower than general, as eyewitnesses relate) would fly in from Russia to the German airport of Spieenberg; they were assigned to pick out the material, direct the operation of loading it in the aircraft and deliver the order to its destination at one of the central bases—the Ministry of Defense base at Ochakovo or the Moscow Military District base. As a rule, accompanying persons would arrive only with powers of attorney (and sometimes even without them), what was drawn was made out in bills of lading, and the materials pass was formalized. Often

those who accompanied the aircraft already had this very pass for crossing the border, i.e., they would turn around and even bypass WGF Headquarters. They would load mainly furniture, tile and wallpaper into the aircraft, which would land in Chkalovskiy or Kubinka, where their contents would be transloaded to motor vehicles.

From Investigation Materials

"In the period from September 1991 through January 1992 some of the purchased materials, tools and equipment worth around 100,000 marks overall was shipped in several lots to the 152nd Work Supervisor's Office, where it was transferred at preferential prices (figured according to the Gosbank rate then existing for noncommercial payments) without payment of customs duties and taxes to the Tek Kap cooperative, created under the Kuybyshevskiy Rayon Soviet Ispolkom of the city of Moscow based on one section of this Office."

Now the question troubling everyone. Did the CINC WGF know about these machinations?

In the procuracy official's words, despite the absence of the name Matvey Burlakov in the document, the last excerpt from it and references made above to purchases through the Dresden Bezirk billeting unit have a relationship to the CINC WGF. The fact is that some of the expensive materials purchased for currency in Germany (wallpaper, tile, sanitary engineering equipment) were used to repair the apartment of CINC WGF Matvey Burlakov. The repair was made from September 1991 to the end of February 1992. The work was done by builders of the Tek Kap construction cooperative (work superintendent Igor Ryskin), established under the 152nd Work Supervisor's Office of the Main Billeting Directorate.

Workers who installed the equipment confirmed the fact that imported equipment had been installed in the apartment of Matvey Burlakov, who lives in the well-known house on Kotelnicheskaya naberezhnaya. It was learned that toilets and mixers requested from Germany had been sent without considering the technological features of the house's sanitary engineering equipment, and a repeat appeal was required to purchase the necessary equipment.

In reading the document one arrives at the conclusion that instances of misappropriation and conversion of material values were an ordinary phenomenon, only opportunities were limited to the "knapsack" size for some, but to the dimensions of a vehicle, railcar or Military-Transport Aviation aircraft for others. "Businessmen" in shoulderboards successfully operated both in the WGF as well as on returning to the Motherland.

From Investigation Materials

"In the course of the check based on information from the WGF military procuracy, instances of misappropriation and conversion of material values purchased for foreign currency and sent from the WGF were identified in various military districts. Thus, in April and November 1992 two railcars with sanitary engineering equipment,

electrical equipment, paint, wallpaper, decorative tile and other materials worth a total of around 132,000 FRG marks were sent to the 148th KEO (Billeting Department—R.Z.) of the city of Sochi to build up the Ministry of Defense North Caucasus region sanatorium. After arriving in Sochi, a large portion of these materials and equipment was sold for rubles at underestimated prices (using the old USSR Gosbank rate for noncommercial payments) to outside organizations and purchased by 148th KEO workers. As a result, according to preliminary data, the state suffered a material loss amounting to R1,536,700."

It would be possible to stop here, but it was learned from the conversation that the interests of the CINC WGF and officials close to him were not limited to commonplace, albeit expensive, toilets, faience sinks or bathroom carpets. Evidently they wanted something big, real, warm and comfortable that would set off the whiteness of cold toilet accessories by its presence. Well, Germany turned out to be a magical "box" filled with "gifts" for those who had the opportunity to open it.

The procuracy official said that so-called captured furniture representing both antique as well as museum value, inasmuch as it had been made for high Reich officials, also was stored at WGF depots. This furniture was made of expensive varieties of wood on a supreme professional and artistic level. By direction of CINC WGF Matvey Burlakov, it was removed from circulation along with unique mirrors and antique clocks and transported to the WGF Billeting Directorate Central Depot and from there delivered by aircraft to the Ministry of Defense central base at Ochakovo. Especially valuable furniture would bypass the WGF Billeting Directorate depot and arrive at a special workshop, where chairs, cheval-glass, schrank, sofas and so on were restored. The work was directed by Burlakov's agent, professional furniture restorer Ivan Bliznyuk, who held the position of joiner's shop chief in the WGF Headquarters Quartermaster Directorate. Being a civilian, he essentially became the commander in chief's personal expert and worked under his command back in Hungary, when Burlakov commanded Southern Group of Forces. Later Ivan Bliznyuk was transferred to Germany at the initiative of the new CINC WGF. Eyewitnesses report that this master engaged in restoring a chair of Göbbels. This chair later disappeared, like many other items of expensive, restored furniture of the Third Reich era. Officers well-informed about this shop's activity presume that the antiques could be sent from there by "personal assignment" as expensive gifts. It may turn out that it is decorating offices and sitting rooms at dachas of the higher command echelon... And the furniture remaining at WGF Billeting Directorate depots was sent to Moscow.

Brief Postscript

We are not hairsplitters and it is not our job to count the toilets of others. The document which fell into our hands does not abound in millions of marks, but it clearly shows the atmosphere of personal gain that formed in the WGF

under the leadership of commander in chief Matvey Burlakov. So did he know about this or not? He knew in the sense that the WGF was entrusted specifically to him.

Most likely the facts cited will not affect relations between Grachev and Burlakov, but they are necessary for a public investigation, as official echelons have placed the final period for themselves in the question: Were there embezzlers of state property in WGF ranks and among its Moscow chiefs? Anticipating the possible reaction of the Minister of Defense, we will note that Pavel Grachev and Matvey Burlakov are not the entire Russian Army. The goal of my notes is to help clean up Armed Forces ranks from any kind of filth and prompt higher-ups to publicly establish the truth, and by no means in order to throw a lump of mud at the Russian Army for the umpteenth time, as some generals would like to depict it.

Further, the military procuracy officer who delivered these documents to the editors asked that his name not be revealed in any form. His desire is understandable. The murder of journalist Dima Kholodov will force anyone to think about his personal safety. I will not hide the fact that the author who prepared the article and initially even decided to sign with a pseudonym also had anxious thoughts. But knowledgeable people suggested that the intelligence network and the service of informants operates actively to this day and it would not be difficult for any special services to establish the true name.

Recalling the death of our colleague Dima Kholodov, the author above all is counting on the force of public opinion and on the public "shield," and signs his name.

Burlakov Interview Discusses Grachev, Commercial Operations in WGF

95UM0081A Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian
No 43, 9-15 Nov 94 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Colonel-General Matvey Prokopyevich Burlakov, former commander of Western Group of Forces, by ROSSIYA columnist Galina Mashtakova, date, place and occasion not specified: "Matvey Burlakov: Someone Wanted To Warn Me..."]

[FBIS Translated Text] The journalistic investigation of the circumstances of Dmitriy Kholodov's death continues. The analysis of facts is inexorable: someone was relying both on this death and on our journalistic reaction immediately afterwards, and they were not wrong. At a single stroke, with barely restrainable indignation over the country's untalented leadership, professional emotion breached the dam of "constructive criticism" and the first wave seemingly considerably damaged the most rotten element in the fence separating the authorities from the people. Disintegration of the Army became too obvious, the "concern" of the minister himself for it is too transparent, and the trade in military installations and property in the Western Group of Forces [WGF] was too brisk. The detonator in the suitcase of the "kompromat" [possible reference to Goskomprom Rossii, the Russian Federation

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State Committee on Industrial Policy] operated and a chain reaction of calculated and well prepared explosions of public opinion began...

On 1 November former WGF Commander Colonel General Burlakov, now in the new capacity of deputy minister, was on a scheduled inspection in an Army subunit near Pechenga, Murmansk Oblast. He was called to the telephone at 1940 hours and Assistant Minister Lapshov informed him: "There is a presidential edict about [your] removal from the position. You have to return..."

On the day after his arrival, the "retired" deputy minister gave an interview in his office to a columnist of the weekly ROSSIYA.

[ROSSIYA] Matvey Prokopyevich, is this betrayal? At any rate, it was a question of a unified command... The president trusts Grachev, Grachev trusts you...

[Burlakov] Dima Kholodov was murdered on the day I began my new duties. I immediately told Pavel Sergeyevich that I should not engage in Ministry of Defense affairs—it was only my first day... It would be advisable to relieve me of this position by ministerial order. Unfortunately, he did not do this. He said that now they would be vilifying us both and if I left, he would get it more alone, and he even would have no one with whom to consult in case something happened... with respect to this vilification... Therefore it was a surprise when this presidential edict came out. In my view, a ministerial order would have been enough. The minister evidently could not make up his mind. And so, he says, he consulted with the president and that is what they decided... I do not wish to call this betrayal. But I was not discharged. I believe the edict will be in effect as long as inspections are ongoing. And when the inspections are over and justice triumphs, I... In general, for now I have departed from active Ministry of Defense work. If guilty, I am ready to bear responsibility. I will await results of the investigation, and if I am innocent, then I will sue MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS for defamation of character.

[ROSSIYA] Do you regard the present situation as a struggle of political forces or a struggle of certain groupings within the Ministry of Defense?

[Burlakov] I believe Dima Kholodov was the victim of a political struggle. More precisely, they simply tossed a person into the bonfire so this bonfire flares up in the entire country and a political struggle goes on. An exceptionally clever, crafty blow was chosen, specifically against the Armed Forces...

[ROSSIYA] Are you sure it was against the Armed Forces and not against specific persons in the upper echelon of military authority?

[Burlakov] I believe it was against the Armed Forces. It was necessary to agitate the Army public. If MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS Chief Editor Gusev believes that thieves and murderers are at the helm of the Army, this has an effect on the man in the street. We have this General Lebed, 14th Army commander. I

never served with him and do not know him personally. Even he, seemingly an experienced person, even he felt doubts about the decency of the minister and deputy minister. He called me a "common swindler." He knows me just as well as Gusev knows me and as Dima Kholodov knew me. We never met. This is what destabilization of the situation in the Army is. I will say that these are just a few, just a few such people. We now are receiving hundreds of letters and telegrams in support. But... the enemy still wishes to destabilize the situation...

[ROSSIYA] You said the word "enemy."

[Burlakov] If I only knew who it was, I would be the first to say. I served four years in Germany and there also were many critics there, but I did not know nor did I even think there could be such a thing—not even criticism, but terrible, frightful accusations.

[ROSSIYA] Matvey Prokopyevich, let us come to an agreement right away as follows: the analytical data bank collected by journalists on the WGF as of today is impressive by the abundance of facts of corruption, speculation and simply theft—so considering this, do you not believe the WGF has been chosen correctly as a target of criticism? You will agree this is the most vulnerable element...

[Burlakov] I believe so, in the sense that the Group was an attractive place. At a time when things were difficult in Russia, both the standard of living and standard of support of course were considerably higher in Germany. I cannot understand why the journalists—and not just they—accuse us almost of stealing, selling, putting money in the bank for ourselves. And they can in no way understand that we never engaged in this. The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations or, more correctly, its Main Technical Directorate, has concerned itself with the Group since 1991. They determined, for example, that this telephone had to be sold and set its price. And we? We just were supposed to clean up this telephone and prepare it for sale. They sold 10,000 tonnes of diesel fuel that way. A firm which arrived from Moscow sold it. I can show you documents. They sold it for 269 marks, but it should have been for 400. We suffered a loss of somewhere around two million marks. But since Moscow was selling it, our procuracy sent the file to Moscow. Now Boldyrev (former Control Directorate chief) is accusing us... A commission was established in 1992 for selling movable and real property, and Arapov comes to me in the rank of a minister of Russia by presidential edict. He works on organizing sales for one and a half years. They immediately come to an agreement about the zero option. Arapov was removed. Rutskoy came to power—he sends his own person, an Air Force colonel who was a regimental commander under him. They removed him. Kirillin arrived from Chubays. I think he sits there to this day. I did not handle any of this, neither I nor my subordinates. The Trade Directorate never was subordinate to the commander in chief—it was subordinate to the Ministry of Defense Main Trade Directorate.

into details with them; they confused us. And I had no time to deal with this, I had to deal with the withdrawal. For how was the Group maintained? The German side allocated three billion to the Group and another three billion to the Soviet Union as interest-free credit for maintaining the Group. And this money went down the drain under Gorbachev. We somehow had to gyrate and economize. Then we began to purchase food products and commodities from firms.

[ROSSIYA] Excuse me, but how did these firms appear?

[Burlakov] They came on their own.

[ROSSIYA] What do you mean? They said they came from "Ivan Ivanych"?..

[Burlakov] Yes, that's the whole point. As a rule, the firms were headed by Russian emigré middlemen. And calls came from Moscow to give the green light to a particular firm, and messengers were sent... It was then, in 1991, that appeals went to Gorbachev, to Shaposhnikov and to Kobets to remove Burlakov inasmuch as he was not helping.

[ROSSIYA] Let's return to the calls and messengers. Who was pulling the strings for the firms and who was sending them?

[Burlakov] It is difficult to remember now. There were 1,500 messengers who arrived in response to the calls. A bag just of calling cards accumulated. There were so many "economic advisers" just from Vice President Rutskoy alone! They phoned from the Supreme Soviet... Emigrés from the Caucasus, from Ukraine and Belorussia poured into the WGF. At one time they had served here and knew all the ins and outs... And they committed outrages under the WGF roof. But now all this is like a trump-card... They say we sold tanks. But it was as if we were being x-rayed by the Germans!

[ROSSIYA] And it was this that permitted us to leave the Germans 25 airfields?

[Burlakov] We left them not 25, but 47 airfields in sum total. Under their laws land has value, but it is not important what is on this land. We did not receive a kopeck for them.

[ROSSIYA] Let us return to the present political situation. Excuse me for directness, but doesn't it seem to you that "dismissal" is only the beginning? Now you "will be given up" to the law-protection agencies to be torn to pieces, for it is better to sacrifice one than to have the entire crew be lost...

[Burlakov] Beginning in 1992 15 persons from the Russian General Procuracy inspected us, not to mention from the military procuracy. In four years there were 36,509 inspectors, not counting those on official business along the lines of the government and Parliament. If it had been possible to "give me up" to the procuracy, they would have done it long ago. Stepankov's silence put me on guard. Now Ilyushenko's silence puts me on guard. He promised me

that he would speak, but instead of this came an edict. Perhaps if he had spoken, there would not have been the edict... I want them to tell the truth!

[ROSSIYA] You give the impression of a naive person. Too naive for your position...

[Burlakov] But what can I do?! There in the Group we of course knew that political passions were raging here in Russia and something was stirring... But I could not even imagine that everything was so complicated...

[ROSSIYA] Excuse me, but specifically what could you not imagine? You consider yourself a "victim" in the situation at hand, which means you have the full right to your own versions...

[Burlakov] In the initial version, when I learned that Dima Kholodov was concerning himself with the WGF and nuclear raw materials and Chechnya, I thought that these were Chechen affairs. That was at first. That is what I thought. We met Chechens there in Germany. These are very organized and crafty people. I analyzed it further and realized that it was not they, it was the political forces—what kind, I now cannot say.

[ROSSIYA] Tell me, in your view are there those among the military (among those who would like to rise not two steps, but at least one step higher) who could make a certain deal with political forces longing for power?

[Burlakov] Of course there are! Of course. The Army is heaving as is all society. There are those both in the leadership and in the lower strata of the military. You yourself heard that Starovoytova is calling Kokoshin minister, somewhere they are calling Gromov [minister], and they already even are calling Lebed [minister]...

You must realize that I am racking my brain and cannot remember. Back there in Germany someone with whom I spoke during the send-off said to me: "Keep in mind that you should not be in Moscow in September-October..." I want to remember and cannot! I wonder if the person knew something.

[ROSSIYA] Was it one of your officers?

[Burlakov] No, he was from Moscow, one of the new arrivals... From the Moscow people who took part in withdrawal measures together with us... I did not have to be there at this time—I had a long leave, but I am not accustomed to vacationing for more than 20 days. I spent 18 days at a health center and reported that I could begin work. And I arrived—this was specifically the first day of work in the ministry, and on this day they killed Dima Kholodov, i.e., I did not heed that advice. But I also did not think that such political battles were going on... Someone knows and forecasts...

[ROSSIYA] ...and even warns?

[Burlakov] Even warns. I can't remember. There was a parade and I did not have time for that...

Author's notes: But this is important, to help General Burlakov remember the name of the one who was standing beside him.

Yeltsin Decree on 95-96 Call-Up of Reserve Officers

95UM0111A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 30 Nov 94 p 1

[Text of decree: "Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the Call-Up of Reserve Officers to Military Service in 1995-96"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In accordance with Article 19 of the Law of the Russian Federation "On the Military Obligation and Military Service," I decree:

1. That the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation [should]:

—each year in 1995-96 call to military service as many as 18,000 citizens who have not gone through military service, who have finished state educational institutions of higher professional training, and who are enrolled in the reserves of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation with the rank of officer, including as many as 8,000 persons immediately upon completion of the indicated institutions, in military occupational specialties or the corresponding civilian specialties in accordance with the appendix;

—each year in 1995-96 send from among the total number of citizens called up: up to 600 persons to the Border Troops, up to 500 to the internal security troops, up to 400 to the railroad troops of the Russian Federation, up to 200 to the civil defense troops, and up to 50 persons to the government signal troops.

2. That the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Civil Defense, Emergency Situations, and the Elimination of the Consequences of Natural Disasters, the Federal Border Service of the Russian Federation, the Federal Directorate of the Railroad Troops under the Ministry of Railways of the Russian Federation, and the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information under the president of the Russian Federation [should] provide that the citizens called up to military service and indicated in Point 1 of the present decree be appointed to positions conforming to their military occupational specialties or corresponding civilian specialties.

3. That the present decree goes into effect the day that it is signed.

[Signed] B. Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation
Moscow, the Kremlin
25 November 1994
No 2113

Listing of Military Occupational Specialties for the Call-Up of Reserve Officers to Military Service in 1995-96 and the Number of Citizens Called Up Under These Specialties

| Name of Specialties | Number (persons annually) |
|---------------------|---------------------------|
| Artillery | 2,000 |
| Motor vehicle | 1,500 |
| Engineering | 700 |
| Communications | 3,000 |
| Road-building | 800 |
| Aviation-technical | 4,000 |
| Medical | 2,000 |
| Finance | 300 |
| Juridical | 1,000 |
| Others | 2,700 |

Decree Creates Plesetsk Cosmodrome Under Ministry of Defense

95UM0080A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Nov 94 p 1

[Item from Kremlin by Vasilii Makashin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "Plesetsk, First Russian Spaceport, Is Created"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russian Federation President B. N. Yeltsin signed Edict No 2077 "On Creation of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense 1st State Experimental Spaceport" on 11 November 1994. Plesetsk Spaceport was formed as part of the Military Space Forces on the basis of the Russian Ministry of Defense Main Center for Testing and Use of Space Equipment.

Having gained a new status, Plesetsk will continue to be used for fulfilling Russian Federation missile-space programs in support of national defense, science, the national economy and international cooperation.

MILITARY POLICY

Grachev Weathers Duma Hearings

95UM0098A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 19 Nov 94 p 1

[Article by Sergey Tsekhmistrenko: "Grachev Left Parliament on a High-Spirited Horse"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The long-awaited appearance of Pavel Grachev before the State Duma, just as the report from another head of a power ministry—Viktor Yerin—from the same platform two days earlier, took place surprisingly quietly. In the final analysis, one even got the impression that there had been a friendly meeting between the minister and the deputies, as though the walls of the Duma had not been shaken many times in recent weeks by

demands for the dismissal of the minister of defense. It is possible that the general mood of the body of deputies was also influenced by the fact that no debate on the results of Grachev's report was planned, and the deputies could express their attitude only indirectly, by facial expressions or modulation of the voice.

By the way, the temperature of the discussion was determined by still another circumstance of considerable importance. It happened that before Grachev spoke, the floor was given to another "power minister"—the director of the FSK [Federal Counterintelligence Service], Sergey Stepashin, who represented the law "On Counterintelligence Agencies" in the Duma. And the deputies, who were obviously in a mood to fight with Grachev, made a false start. The role of instigator was played by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, whose speech on the draft law took place with his usual accusations against counterintelligence and against its leader personally for aiding foreign special services. As a result, Stepashin promised Zhirinovskiy that they would meet the next time in court and the attention of the deputies shifted to the vote on taking the right to speak away from the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia for three sessions, whereby even his comrade in arms Aleksandr Vengerovskiy got carried away and voted for this (and did not realize his mistake until an hour and a half later). As a result, the steam had largely been released by the time Grachev came to the platform.

It must be recognized that Grachev, following the example of Yerin, was tactically correct in the organization of his report. Since in accordance with the demand of the members of the Duma it was dedicated to the morale and psychological climate in the Russian Army, the minister did not deny "shortcomings in this area," but in so doing he called for them to follow the principle known from medicine—treat the patient rather than the illness. The minister concentrated most of his attention on the old Marxist postulate that the basis determines the superstructure. Translated to the language of Grachev, this sounded approximately as follows: The shortage of funds allocated for the support of the Armed Forces is the primary factor determining the internal climate. The picture painted by Grachev could give the unprepared listener the impression of the rapid degradation of the Army in recent years. In his words, the Army receives from the budget only half of the funding designated for it, which is barely enough for the support of personnel. As a result, many officers have found themselves below the poverty line and facing a difficult choice: Either be discharged from the ranks of the Armed Forces or combine their service with work as a yard man or night watchman or get involved in "commerce forbidden in the Army" or simply steal. And if other factors are added to this, from curtailments of military production and inadequate deliveries of armament and military equipment to the severe psychological trauma from the disintegration of the USSR and Warsaw Pact, then the picture becomes quite gloomy indeed.

Nevertheless, the conclusion of the minister was the direct opposite: The Army remains a combat-ready state institute, and despite all that has been said, it is still prepared to guarantee the security of the country and to repel any attack. The secret is simple: "In Russia, they always served not for pay, but out of faith in the Czar and Fatherland." Grachev sees successful peacekeeping operations in the CIS and in the former Yugoslavia as proof that the Army is not demoralized. And the minister finished his speech on a spirited horse, declaring to the hushed legislators that they remain indebted to the Army but do have the chance to improve themselves and to change the expenditures for the Armed Forces in next year's budget. After such a victorious report, Grachev did not turn the initiative over to the deputies and easily parried every question—whether he touched on the link between the murder of Dmitriy Kholodov and corruption in the Western Group of Forces or on the impoverished state of the Navy, where, it turns out, the "Women of Russia" went recently on an inspection.

Zhirinovskiy Deputy on Defense Budget, Geopolitical Aims

954F0340A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Nov 94 pp 1-2

[Article by Aleksandr Dmitriyevich Vengerovskiy, deputy chairman of the State Duma of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly, deputy chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia faction in the State Duma, and Oleg Yevgenyevich Antonov, laboratory chief, GosNII [State Scientific-Research Institute] of Aviation Systems, doctor of technical sciences, under "Platform" rubric: "Where the Military Budget Begins: A Problem Taken in the Light of Russia's Geopolitical Aims"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As is generally known, Mr. Zhirinovskiy, leader of the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] was supposed to fly to the United States, having received an entry visa from the Americans, who, more than others, had demanded of their Western allies that they close off to Zhirinovskiy all channels for penetration to the West. What was linked with this change in the rigid American position is a topic for separate discussion. It is, however, clear that the trip promises to be a noisy one.

Zhirinovskiy's party is the party of a single person, but that does not mean that other leaders of that party do not exist at all, for example, the more moderate and much more intellectual Mr. Vengerovskiy, who is, in addition, the deputy speaker of the State Duma.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA many times has rejected articles by the "liberal democrats," including Mr. Zhirinovskiy himself, that have been sent to the editorial office. But on the eve of his arrival in the United States, we feel that it is necessary to acquaint our readers with an insightful article by Mr. Vengerovskiy (with a coauthor) that was sent by him to the editorial office. The article is printed with certain minor abridgements.

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The constant failures with the budgetary financing of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the military-industrial complex (VPK) are leading to a chronic headache for the government and parliament. The pressure being exerted by the lobbying groups seems to be deflecting from analysis the justifications for the financial demands of the military and the VPK. At least a broad group of specialists do not know of a single convincing document concerning what funds are actually required for the state's military activities. The figures contained in the draft of the country's budget were born deep within the MO [Ministry of Defense], and they possibly reflect correctly the necessity of maintaining the existing army, as well as developing or purchasing armaments for it. However, so far no one has convincingly substantiated specifically what this kind of army, with its modern structure and size, requires under the new geopolitical conditions and specifically what weapons it should be provided with.

No answer to these questions is provided either in the publication that was developed by the MO and approved by the president of Russia in November of last year—"Basic Principles of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation."

We might note that the United States has already reviewed its geopolitical goals after the collapse of the USSR. The Pentagon carried out an analysis of its tasks and determined what armed forces and weapons systems it needs under the new conditions. But we, as usual, are lagging behind.

A scrupulous analysis of those situations into which Russia may be drawn, and those potential opponents with whom there may be a military confrontation, is lacking in the basic principles of the doctrine, if one speaks about that part of them that was published in the open press.

In order to get closer to the truth, it is necessary to choose certain points of departure, by moving away from which it is possible in the final analysis to define the required level of financing. The natural point of departure for getting a reading is the determination of Russia's geopolitical interests under the new conditions in all the regions of the world and, as a consequence, what paths should be taken to implement those interests, including the military ones.

The cessation of Russia's ideological confrontation with the developed capitalist countries, which confrontation served as a means for achieving the world dominance of communism, has sharply reduced the probability of any major armed conflicts with the states that were traditionally viewed as "probable opponents." Russia lays no claim to global world dominance and feels that no other country or group of countries should have such claims either. Nevertheless, Russia's interests, which are basically of an economic nature, have been preserved in practically all parts of the world. However, the transitional political situation and the very serious economic situation in the country are

forcing its current leadership to devote their basic attention to domestic problems. Russia's geopolitical interests have receded into the background, and that has immediately led to increased actions on the part of other states to fill the vacuum that is forming. As a consequence, there appeared unfounded territorial and other claims on the part of adjoining states that consider themselves to be aggrieved, and this, in a number of instances, is creating a threat to international understandings concerning the stability of boundaries in the world and is laying the foundation for local international conflicts.

Inasmuch as Russia's geopolitical interests throughout the world are rather extensive, while the opportunities for implementing them at the present time and in the near future will be limited, it is desirable to divide these interests into two groups—immediate and remote. The sphere of interests in the first group encompasses those regions where Russia's interests manifest themselves especially clearly and require immediate and constant practical actions as a result of their proximity to the country's boundaries, their large economic or political importance, as well as the existence of military-political conflicts in those regions. The interests in the second group encompass regions with respect to which Russia is carrying out the minimal actions aimed at preventing irreversible changes to Russia's detriment.

Russia's closest geopolitical interests, having in mind the further building on their base of the armed forces and the VPK, can be formulated by consistently considering the interrelations with all the closest neighbors.

If one begins with Russia's northwest, there may be potential disputes with **Norway** with regard to questions of the industry deriving products from the sea in northern waters, the development of the continental shelf, and deposits of petroleum and other mineral resources, but one would hardly think that any problems concerning the land boundary will arise there in the near future. Consequently, in order to resolve moot questions, it is necessary to have only maritime border units and the Northern Fleet, with the latter being in an extremely limited makeup, even taking into consideration Norway's membership in NATO.

With **Finland**, which observes neutrality, in order to resolve disputes it is completely sufficient to have mobile land troops and a small-sized Baltic Fleet. This kind of fleet will apparently also be sufficient to guarantee the normal functioning of the free economic zone that is being created in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad Oblast. For the Baltic countries, economic pressure, reinforced by border-troops and MVD units, is sufficient.

With **Belorussia Belarus and Ukraine**, by virtue of the many centuries of kinship (historic, ethnic, linguistic) ties, there ought to be no disputes at all to be resolved by military force. The observance of Russia's interests in the aspect being considered by us can be made the responsibility of small-sized units of border troops, the customs agencies, and the MVD.

With Turkey the question is more complicated. On the one hand, Turkey is on the economic ascendancy, and, despite its membership in NATO, it makes no sense for Turkey to risk the standard of living that has been achieved, other than under the protection of the United States. Therefore, the existence of the Black Sea Fleet in neutral waters close to Turkey could prove to be a convincing argument.

The former republics of the Transcaucasus do not have their own regular or combat-ready armies that are considerable in size and, in addition, depend almost completely upon Russia with regard to shipments of weapons and, most importantly, ammunition. They do not have any economic opportunities for purchasing weapons in the West, even with the support of their diasporas in the developed countries. It is necessary to mention Azerbaijan separately. Recently the international agreement by a number of petroleum companies concerning the development of the petroleum deposits in the Caspian Sea can be viewed as a serious threat to Russia's economic interests. This is confirmed by the rigid position taken by the Russian MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] concerning this question. This precedent forces the reconsideration of the question of the reinforcement of Russia's military presence in the Caspian Sea, for example, by transferring low-tonnage vessels from the Black Sea Fleet to the Caspian (if this is technically feasible). In connection with this and with recent statements by Turkey concerning the possible limitation or even ban on the passage of oil tankers through the Bosphorus Strait, it is possible that a further reinforcement of the Black Sea Fleet will be required. It is beneficial for Russia to have Azerbaijani crude oil pumped through Russian petroleum pipelines to Russian ports and, from there, carried throughout the world on tankers, rather than shipping it through petroleum pipelines laid across the territory of Turkey and Iran. The reinforcement of the Caspian Flotilla is also necessary to deal with any possible complications in the relations with Iran as a result of the industry deriving products from the sea or the drilling of petroleum at sea.

In order to resolve moot questions with Afghanistan and the southern republics of Central Asia, it is completely sufficient to maintain the existing level and concentration of land troops, aviation, and air assault formations. The northern oblasts of Kazakhstan are populated basically by Russians, and therefore, as in the case of Ukraine and Belorussia, no disputes to be resolved by military force can arise there.

Finally, our Far Eastern neighbors—China, Korea, and Japan.

First, the overpopulation in those countries at the present time, and even more so in the future, forces them to turn their gaze to the north, to the practically uninhabited land in Siberia and the Far East, with their very rich raw material resources and fertile soil.

Secondly, the great length of the land boundary and the undeveloped state of the transportation and communications infrastructure create tremendous difficulties for exploiting the reserves in the event that a real threat arises.

Thirdly, the existence of nuclear weapons and powerful means to deliver them in the hands of China, which, incidentally, only last year signed the nuclear weapons nonproliferation treaty; North Korea's nuclear program; and the recently shown high political and economic activity of the United States with respect to that country, make it necessary, when implementing Russia's geopolitical interests, to devote first-priority attention specifically to the Far Eastern region. If, in addition, one adds to what has been said the existence in that region of Russia of an economically and, in the not too distant future, politically strong Korean diaspora, as well as the non-visa border system with China, which is leading to the concealed expansion of the Chinese into the Far East and Maritime Kray, it becomes obvious that we are dealing with a delayed-action bomb that we have created with our own hands and installed in a vitally important place in the country.

Fourth, there is Japan's constantly increasing economic and political influence upon the countries in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as the rapid economic growth of South Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines.

And finally, there is the use of the international drug mafia in the Far Eastern corridor for delivering drugs to Russia and disseminating them throughout the world, as well as the constantly growing threat of modern piracy in the Pacific Ocean.

Hence, it is becoming obvious that the makeup and correlation among the components of the armed forces for guaranteeing the implementation of geopolitical goals in the Far East region require special systems study. At such time the emphasis here must be placed on developing and introducing high-technology and effective tactical weapons, including so-called humane types of them, which irreversibly put the opponent's technology out of commission and temporarily disorganize his manpower, and on modernizing and further developing the Pacific Ocean Fleet and its naval bases, and the equipping of the border troops with the latest means for detecting and preventing a mass violation of the border.

And now to discuss the United States and Western Europe. The intensification of the economic integration of North and South America under the U.S. protector, simultaneously with the dynamic development of the major Latin American countries, objectively results in the drawing away of considerable U.S. funds and efforts to that region, reducing their influence on the Eurasian continent. That process is promoted by the stable and powerful development of a united Europe, the withdrawal of American troops from Germany, the closing of second-rate military bases, and the understanding by the leadership of the West European countries of the need to integrate Russia's economy into world economic space and primarily into its European part.

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As a result, the new zones and the ones that are closest in time for the geopolitical interests of Russia and its former basic probable opponents, practically speaking, no longer intersect.

The proposed scheme for Russia's geopolitical interests, unconditionally, must take into consideration the fact that Russia is among the few countries in the world that possess strategic nuclear forces, and, to a large extent, that determines the existing military-political stability. Moreover, the maintenance of such forces in a condition that guarantees the carrying out of responsive actions with the required effectiveness is for Russia the guarantee of the effectiveness of its geopolitics.

Of course, the priority when resolving moot questions must be given to negotiations, at which, however, our position must be reinforced by the appropriate military capabilities.

STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES

SS-19 Missile at Yuzhmashzavod for Destruction

95UM0080B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 15 Nov 94 p 1

[Item from Dnepropetrovsk by Anatoliy Polyakov: "SS-19 Missiles Will Be Destroyed at Yuzhmash Association"]

[FBIS Translated Text] SS-19 intercontinental missiles appeared without any maskirovka [lit. "camouflage", however, includes "concealment" and "deception"—FBIS] on the spur tracks of one of the shops of the Yuzhnyy mashinostroitelnyy zavod Association. Here is where they will be destroyed under the START I Treaty.

A few days ago U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine William Miller visited the plant, which until recently had been absolutely closed to foreigners. The Americans will supply equipment for a special shop for eliminating the missiles. A total of 130 will be destroyed here. The shop being created is fully safe ecologically.

GROUND TROOPS

NSV 12.7MM 'Utes' Heavy Machine Gun

95UM0112B Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA
in Russian No 5, 1994 p 22

[Article by engineer S. Fedoseyev under "Ask and We Answer" rubric: "Large-Caliber Machine Gun NSV-12.7 'Utes'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Large-caliber machine guns appeared at the end of World War I as a means of combating the enemy's tanks and aircraft. In 1938, the RKKA [Workers and Peasants Red Army] acquired the 12.7mm machine gun DShK ("Degtyrev-Shpagin, large caliber") with a belt feed on a universal Kolesnikov mount and on road wheels. At the end of the Great Patriotic War,

K. Sokolov and A. Norov modernized the machine gun, modifying the feed mechanism, improving its reliability and viability, and simplifying production. In 1946, they introduced the machine gun DShKM, which was the basic large-caliber machine gun of the Soviet Army from the 1950's until the 1970's. By the end of the 1960's, however, it no longer satisfied contemporary requirements for mobility—it was too heavy (148 kg).

In the mid-1970's, they introduced a model that was developed by G. Nikitin, Yu. Sokolov, and V. Volkov and that was designated the NSV-12.7 ("Nikitin, Sokolov, Volkov, 12.7mm") "Utes." It utilized the previous 12.7mm cartridge of the model 1930/38 (12.7 x 108). The automatic action of the machine gun operates by the discharge of powder gases through a lateral opening in the wall of the barrel. The barrel is detachable and has eight grooves. It is attached to the receiver with the help of a wedge. There is a conical flame suppressor on the muzzle end. There is a folding handle on the barrel for the comfortable carrying of the machine gun. The gas chamber is located under the barrel and is equipped with a device to regulate the amount of discharged gases with two fixed positions, which makes it possible to adapt the automatic action to the conditions of the operation of the machine gun. The rod of the gas piston is hinged to the bolt carrier. A buffer spring is installed in the rear part of the return mechanism that lessens the blow of the bolt carrier. The bore is closed during firing by the camming action of the bolt. The fired cartridge is extracted in the recoil by the bolt catchers. The reloading lever located on the right is not rigidly linked with the bolt carrier and remains immovable during firing. The trigger mechanism permits only uninterrupted fire and is mounted in a separate casing that is attached above on the rear part of the barrel receiver. A thumb safety catch closes a sear restraining the bolt carrier in the rear position. The firing mechanism operates from the recoil-hammer spring.

The NSV-12.7 has a belt feed. The belt is metallic with an open link. The feed mechanism works in the recoil of the movable parts of the automatic action. The machine gun may have left or right feed of the belt, which makes it possible to mount it on complex (multibarrel) devices. In firing from the NSV-12.7 "Utes," use is made of cartridges with the B-32 armor-piercing incendiary bullet, the BZT-44 armor-piercing incendiary tracer bullet, and the MDZ immediate-action incendiary bullet. The armor-piercing bullet penetrates armor 16 mm thick at a range of 500 meters.

The weight of the "body" of the NSV-12.7 is 25 kg, the length is 1.56 meters, the initial velocity of the round is 845 meters/second, the range of direct firing at a target 2 meters high is 850 meters, the rate of fire is 700-800 rounds a minute, the effective rate of fire is 80 to 100 rounds a minute, and the capacity of the belt is 50 cartridges and it may be linked with several other belts.

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The optical SPP (small-arms machine gun sight) sight attached to the left rear of the barrel receiver of the machine gun serves as the main sight. The sight reticle has a special range-finding scale. Its optical system includes a luminescent screen for detection of sources of infrared radiation. The weight of the SPP is 1.7 kg, the magnifying power is 3X and 4X, and the field of vision is 12 degrees and 6 degrees. Besides the optical sight, it has an open sector sight whose rear sight base is attached to the body of the trigger mechanism, whereas the front sight is in front of the gas chamber. Light-gathering night sights may be mounted on the machine gun.

For firing at ground targets, the NSV 12.7 is attached to a 6T7 tripod mount (design of L. Stepanovich and K. Baryshev) with the help of a cradle, on which is also mounted a spring-controlled tubular butt, a pistol grip, a trigger mechanism, and a reloading mechanism. The shoulder support of the butt is made in the form of a rectangular sling and is comfortable for grasping by the palm of the hand during firing or carrying. The mount has mechanisms for horizontal and vertical sighting. Its legs are equipped with supports in the form of spike feet. A tray is attached to a special support to facilitate the feeding of the belt. In regulating the position of the mount legs, it is possible to change the height of the line of fire from 310 to 410 mm. The weight of the NVS-12.7 on the 6T7 mount is 41 kg, the length is 1.9 meters, the height is 380 mm, the sighting range is 2,000 meters, the laying angles are plus or minus 25 degrees on the horizontal and from minus 8 to plus 10 degrees on the vertical, that is, it is not possible to fire at air targets. The close grouping of rounds fired is rather great—at 1,000 meters, the average deviation from the horizontal and vertical does not exceed 1.45 meters. The crew of the NSV-12.7 is two men. In the transport position, the mount is folded compactly and is carried behind the back of the second member of the gun crew. In combat, the crew may move the machine gun on the mount, utilizing the barrel handle and the butt of the mount, or they can pull it using a strap.

The design of the 6T7 makes it possible to attach the machine gun with its mount on 6U10 and 6U11 assemblies in embrasures of permanent emplacements. It can quickly be separated from the emplacement mount for use outside the structure by the crew.

For antiaircraft fire with the NSV-12.7, it is possible to utilize a universal 6U6 mount that was developed under the guidance of R. Purtsen and introduced at the same time as the machine gun. The assembly is comprised of the lower mount representing a stable tripod with spike feet and the upper mount that revolves 360 degrees. The design of the upper mount includes a machine gun cradle with a device for the attachment of the receiver to the belt, a gunner's seat, mechanisms for vertical and horizontal sighting, a collimating antiaircraft sight of the type VK-4, and a ground sight of the type PU. The mechanism for vertical sighting makes possible firing

with large angles of elevation and depression. For transport, the 6U6 mount is dismantled. The weight of the machine gun on the 6U6 mount is 92.5 kg and the reach is an altitude of 1,500 meters. The time required to change from a traveling to an operational position—and back—is no more than two minutes.

The NSV-12.7 "Utes" is the most up to date of the large-caliber machine guns in use and is distinguished by its relatively small weight and good maneuverability. It is utilized as the antiaircraft weapon of the basic tanks T-64, T-72, and T-80 and of warships. It is utilized only in the countries of the former USSR.

Col-Gen Demidyuk on Oka Missile Ban, Military Reform

95UM0093A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 19 Nov 94 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Colonel-General Nikolay Mikhaylovich Demidyuk, commander in chief of the Russian Ground Forces Missile Troops and Artillery, by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA military commentator Nikolay Plotnikov; place and date not given: "Every Fourth Ground Forces Serviceman Is a Missileer or Artilleryman: For the Commander in Chief, Russian Ground Forces Missile Troops and Artillery Anniversary Is an Opportunity To Discuss Problems"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

The Army

[Plotnikov] Nikolay Mikhaylovich, what are the Russian Ground Forces Missile Troops and Artillery like today?

[Demidyuk] First of all, I would like to remind you that this is one of the oldest branches of troops of the Russian Army. In 1994 we commemorated the 612th anniversary of the formation of native artillery. What are the current missile troops and artillery like? The best formations and units, equipped with the most modern weapons, are deployed in Ukraine and Belarus. Therefore, after the well-known events we largely had to start over practically from zero. At the present time the missile troops and artillery are organizationally represented by artillery divisions, missile and artillery brigades, artillery, anti-tank, missile-technical, and reconnaissance units and subunits, and military educational institutions. Some formations have their own artillery, beginning with the motorized rifle company right up to operational-strategic combined formations. Practically every fourth serviceman at the regimental, division, and army levels belongs to our branch of troops because it is it that carries the primary load for effective engagement of the enemy in battle.

[Plotnikov] Right now much is being said about reform of the Armed Forces. To what degree has this affected the missile troops and artillery and how is it being manifested?

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[Demidyuk] The principle of the transition from quantitative to qualitative indicators has been laid at the foundation of reform. We have in mind acceptance into the inventory of new, more effective missile and artillery systems, and a transition to the employment of precision-guided munitions, reconnaissance-strike and reconnaissance-fire systems. If previously fire was carried out primarily against area-formation targets during the accomplishment of fire missions, now individual targets within a formation are being destroyed. Of course, all of this requires new developments. They exist, but normal financing is needed. It is problematic to discuss large-scale reforms without it... Reforms will not progress until the state pays serious attention and concern to the army. I will cite just one example. The R-300 operational-tactical missile system with a 300 kilometer launch range is in the missile troops inventory. The missile was developed for a nuclear warhead. As we all know, tactical nuclear weapons are being reduced, but combat units still do not have conventional warheads. The system has been in our army's inventory for 34 years. It has already been obsolete for a long time. It will cease to exist in two or three years. There are good developments for new systems, but unfortunately matters will not progress beyond developments due to inadequate financing. And what does depriving us of this class of missiles signify? We need to destroy the enemy in the entire depth of his operational formation... It is no accident that developments are occurring and that new systems are being accepted into the inventory in all of the highly-developed countries.

[Plotnikov] In this case, was the destruction of the Oka operational-tactical missile systems justified?

[Demidyuk] That is the crime of the century. Sooner or later the culprits will be named. The Oka's maximum launch range was approximately 400 kilometers. Despite all our desires, the missile could not fly beyond that distance. The destruction of our country's newest system inflicted enormous damage in the context of military security, without even mentioning the multimillions of rubles in losses.

[Plotnikov] Did the Americans have such a system at that time?

[Demidyuk] No. And they did everything to achieve the destruction of the Oka. There are still no equivalents to it in the world. This was a splendid, mobile, automated system with a highly accurate missile.

[Plotnikov] What kind of problems are there in the development of artillery?

[Demidyuk] I will state without exaggeration—we have good weapons. But technical systems for artillery reconnaissance and fire control systems are a weak area. Priority direction has been assigned to their development. But, I repeat, normal financing is needed.

Another urgent problem is the accumulation of trained mobilization reserves. No matter how hard it has been,

new systems have been entering the inventory since 1991. There are not enough compulsory service military personnel. Consequently, we are not training enough specialists. Previously we conducted training at training assemblies. But right now it has been disrupted. If the command to deploy at full unit and formation personnel strength is issued tomorrow, we will not be able to do so. The missile troops and artillery—this is not a branch of troops where you can train a specialist in a week.

[Plotnikov] During the course of reforms, has any kind of standardization of artillery systems been provided for?

[Demidyuk] Standardization has been going on for a long time. The Msta-S self-propelled variant and the Msta-B towed variant of the 152-mm howitzer will become the basic weapon. It has a high rate of fire (up to 10 rounds per minute) and accuracy of fire. Its firing range is up to 25 km and the rocket-assisted projectile—up to 30 km. For comparison: The American M109A2 155-mm self-propelled howitzer that is in the inventory of a number of NATO armies has a rate of fire of 4-5 rounds per minute, a firing range of 18 km, and the rocket-assisted projectile—24 km.

Msta is the weapon of the future. It has enormous prospects for further improvement. A precision-guided projectile has been developed for the weapon. At the arms exhibition conducted at Abu Dhabi (United Arab Emirates) in 1993, of 40 Krasnopol precision-guided munitions, 39 destroyed the target—a tank at a range of up to 15 km. But then again, all the hits were to the tank turret. The weapon is entering the artillery regiments of motorized rifle and tank divisions, and army and corps artillery brigades. However, the numbers entering the inventory are insignificant.

[Plotnikov] The end-of-training-period combat training performance evaluation recently occurred in the troops. What are its results?

[Demidyuk] Despite problems with financing, we conducted all the planned exercises with the missile troops. Half of the missile brigades went to the Kapustin Yar State Range. Exercises were conducted without any simplifications whatsoever. The formation commander was handed the combat order right at the debarkation station and then a march of 200-300 km took place to the position area with the subsequent conduct of a missile strike. Sixty launches were conducted in 1994. Of them, more than half were "outstanding" or "good." Exercises are occurring, but I must admit that they are occurring with difficulty. Some launchers are 25-30 years old. There are not enough spare parts or fuel.

In all military districts, artillery went out to the camps twice—for 20 days in the winter and for 30 days in the summer. All planned live firings were conducted, but nearly all of them were either as part of officer crews or as an individual firing officer. The primary reason is low manning by compulsory service military personnel.

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[Plotnikov] How is reform of the military education system progressing?

[Demidyuk] VUZ [military higher educational institutions] reform in the ground forces missile troops and artillery has practically been completed. After 1991 we lost four artillery schools—three in Ukraine and one in Georgia. A total of two remained. The VUZ system turned out to be practically destroyed. In a short period of time we managed to open an artillery school at Yekaterinburg. This year it has already completed its first graduation. We have opened a department under the Artillery Academy at which middle school graduates are being taught. These are the future officer artillerymen of the army of the 21st century. They are training to service reconnaissance-strike and reconnaissance-fire systems. As a result of the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons, one missile school—Kazan—has been transformed into an artillery school. Now we only train missileers at Saratov. We have our own Artillery Academy and our own scientific-research institute. Pre-VUZ training is being carried out at the St. Petersburg Missile-Artillery Cadet Corps.

I would like to take advantage of this opportunity to congratulate veterans of the Great Patriotic War, the Armed Forces, servicemen and their family members, designers, and defense industry workers on the anniversary of the date—the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Missile Troops and Artillery holiday. I wish them good health, prosperity, and tolerance in our difficult time.

Col-Gen Dimidyuk Interviewed on Missile, Artillery Troops Day

95UM0095A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 19 Nov 94 pp 1-2

[Interview with Colonel-General Nikolay Dimidyuk, commander of the Ground Forces Missile Forces and Artillery, by Oleg Vladykin; place and date not given: "The Difficult Times Will End, Believes Colonel-General Nikolay Dimidyuk"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

[begin box]

From the files of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. N.M. Dimidyuk was born in 1937 in the city of Aleysk in Altay Kray. He has been in the army since 1954. He finished the Sumy Artillery School. He served in different command positions in the forces. He finished the Military Artillery Academy in 1974 and the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1986. He was chief of the missile forces and artillery of Transbaykal Military District in the Southwest Sector. He came to the central staff of the Ministry of Defense in 1989. He has been commander of missile forces and artillery of the Ground Forces since October 1991.

[end box]

[Dimidyuk] First of all, I would like to direct your attention to the following fact. One out of four servicemen in the Ground Forces is an artilleryman. And in the years of the Great Patriotic War there was one artillery force for every three rifle divisions. Now the entire combined-arms structure is completely permeated with artillery. The army has its own artillery beginning with the frontal level and beyond. There are guided antitank missiles in the division, in every motorized regiment, in the battalion, and even in the platoons.

I note this so that one can understand the loss of personnel that occurred in our branch of the army after the collapse of the USSR. Four of the six military schools that trained artillery officers for the Soviet Army ended up outside the boundaries of Russia—three in Ukraine and one in Georgia.

[Vladykin] But the Russian Federation did not inherit the entire Soviet Army, only part of it. And that part was subsequently reduced and will continue to be reduced in the future....

[Dimidyuk] Still, it was the largest part. But what was left of the military educational institutions of our branch of the army is the smallest part. The result was that there was a rapid increase in undermanning of primary officer positions in artillery subunits. Only now have we been able to stop this process, thanks to the fact that we tried to bring about a fundamental reorganization of our higher educational system in two years.

By decision of the minister of defense we were given a military-political school in Yekaterinburg, which we reorganized into a command artillery school. The two senior classes were graduated under the old program, but we offered the youngsters in the first and second classes, who had already received basic military training but who still had the opportunity to master a new speciality in two years, the chance to study to be artillery commanders. About 80 percent of the cadets agreed. In the summer of this year the Yekaterinburg Artillery School graduated its first officers.

True, it was necessary to dissolve one school in Russia, the one in St. Petersburg. Squeezed into a small space by urban structures, it had no possibility at all for development. We closed it. In its place we established an artillery school at the site of the Kazan Missile School. There were two higher schools in Russia for the missile units of the Ground Forces. Another one is the command-engineering school in Saratov. But the international obligations of our state to reduce missile weapons made the existence of two such higher institutes of learning unnecessary. We left the one in Saratov in operation but we reorganized the one in Kazan, as I said. Its rich educational-material base has become a good basis for the establishment of a promising artillery school.

[Vladykin] Could you say that all these measures will make it possible to resolve the problem, as you put it, of the loss of personnel in the branch of the army?

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[Dimidyuk] I can. In the first place, we now have three wonderful artillery schools, counting the older Kolomenskoye School (formerly Konstantinovskoye). In addition to that, we opened a department in the artillery academy where we now accept youths immediately after they finish secondary school. There is no need to talk a lot about the prestige of receiving an academic education. Meanwhile, the command schools that beginning this year have been put on a five-year program of instruction have become more attractive for graduates from secondary school. From now on the graduates from these institutes of higher learning will receive the diploma of an electromechanical engineer, the highest qualification for a specialist under the multilevel system of education in the country. That alone has already made it possible to increase the competition for our schools noticeably. Whereas in 1992-93 it was 0.8 to 1.5 persons for each available place, it increased to three in the more recent entrance exams at the Kolomenskoye Artillery School, for example.

So our calculations show that the undermanning of primary officer positions will practically be eliminated within two years.

[Vladykin] But where is the guarantee that all of these specialists will unconditionally serve for many years? Many young officers are now being discharged from the armed forces.... Are you taking this into account?

[Dimidyuk] Yes, unfortunately we are seeing this phenomenon. There is probably only one way to overcome it and that is by substantially improving the social position of service personnel. We are trying to resolve this problem as well within the scope of the funds allocated to us.

Let us take, for example, the most urgent problem in this area, the housing problem.

At the present time there are 14,000 people in the missile forces and artillery who do not have apartments. By the way, the largest part of them are in St. Petersburg, where several of our units and educational institutions and establishments are concentrated. People have been waiting for housing for many years, and when their turn finally comes, it is time for them to be discharged to the reserves on account of their age....

Still, some changes have been planned here. For example, we withdrew the 34th Artillery Division from the Western Group of Forces to the Moscow Military District. The funds that Germany allocated under the treaty for the withdrawal of troops were used to build a town for service personnel having 2,000 apartments and a large number of social and cultural facilities. In Tver about the same number of apartments will soon be turned over for use. And there the housing question will essentially be ended for the units of our branch of the army, although I must note that it will remain acute for many other garrisons in the foreseeable future.

[Vladykin] Alas, overall this problem is the most troublesome for the armed forces today. I have heard commanders of military units as well as commanders at a higher level say that they consider it hopeless to demand from officers that they exert a full effort in their service and in the organization of combat training when they are forced to spend years trying to secure a roof over their heads. At the same time, there is no shortage of assurances of the high combat readiness of the units. Is there not a contradiction here?

[Dimidyuk] It certainly is naive in the present situation to expect officers to have all their thoughts concentrated on their service. Still, there is no contradiction in the fact that although they find themselves in extremely difficult circumstances, service personnel are maintaining the combat readiness of subunits and units at the necessary level. This is accomplished primarily through the solid potential of the professionalism of our officer corps. We in the missile forces and artillery are doing all that we can not to waste this priceless wealth.

As difficult as it may be, we are striving for the full execution of the combat readiness plans. We must not allow specialists to lower the level of their professional skills. For this reason, the artillery regiments and divisions are required to go out to field camps for a month once every six months and to spend a maximum amount of time there on combat shooting. Even if they are not able to carry out full-value exercises regularly at the place of their permanent stationing because of huge personnel shortages, an effort is being made in the field to overcome this misfortune. In the place of the missing soldiers, officers frequently sight the weapons and perform the duties of plotters. At times the crews are made up entirely of officers. Of course a situation like this cannot be called normal. But at least we are preserving the most valuable thing, people's professionalism.

In the past training year all planned tactical exercises with missile brigades were carried out in full. More than half of them occurred with the surprise withdrawal of units to the national test range. They transported full brigades 1,500 to 2,000 km by railroad. At the end of the road they handed the commander a package with a field order. He then led his subordinates with their equipment to an unknown area to take up their positions. There they immediately launched missiles. The troops launched 60 of them during the training year and did so quite successfully.

You might say that this is a pleasure that is too costly during these times. How can one get the funds for this? I do not dispute the fact that this is very difficult, but we insisted on the funding and showed over and over again that without exercises and combat shooting the troops will cease to be troops. And we had our way....

The result, as they say, is apparent. Deputy Minister of Defense Colonel-General G.G. Kondratyev recently inspected the Volga Military District. There the missile brigades under the command of Colonels V. Novikov

and Yu. Poluektov demonstrated their possibilities very well. There the artillery regiment under the command of Lt. Col. S. Kolesnikov showed good results. And there are units and combined units in other districts as well that are capable of performing any task assigned to them. In Moscow Military District, for example, there is the brigade of Col. Yu. Solovyev that is equipped with powerful Smerch multiple rocket launchers. In the Far East, the combat proficiency of the missile brigade of Col. I. Tangatarov is brilliant. I can honestly say that I am really proud of these people.

[Vladykin] One can understand the feelings that the commander has about the successes of his subordinates. For this reason, on the eve of Missile Forces and Artillery Day, I propose that through the newspaper you tell the people who pleased you in the past academic year what you consider to be most significant as of today.

[Dimidyuk] As senior chief, I will simply say: "Thanks for your honorable service." And as an officer and professional colleague, I will also note this: We will believe in a quick end to hard times. There will certainly be changes for the better, for it cannot be otherwise. Actually, on their behalf we are now sometimes doing much more than would seem to be possible for ordinary people in the present conditions.

AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Comparison of US, Russian Fighter Aircraft

95UM0101A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Nov 94 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Colonel Aleksandr Manushkin: "Fighter Aircraft as Air Superiority Weapons: A Military Commentator's Notes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] I have seen the work of the "Russkiye vityazi" [Russian Knights] and "Strizhi" [Swifts] aerobatics teams in the air of Kubinka, Tushino, and other airfields. And like everyone else, I did not tire of being captivated by the meticulous polish of their skill. They demonstrate such a cascade of aerobatic maneuvers that it takes your breath away and you simply marvel: Are people and the aircraft they control really capable of this?

And the aces from Kubinka fly Su-27 and MiG-29 interceptors. I don't stress this by chance. They were in general developed not to captivate the public with head-spinning "pirouettes". These aircraft are needed to shoot down, destroy and exterminate the airborne enemy. That is why they are called fighters.

HISTORICAL INFORMATION. The fighter had already appeared as a specialized type of aircraft during the First World War. The first of them in the Russian

Army was the RBVZ [Russian-Baltic Railroad-Car Plant] S-16 twin-seat aircraft (1915). The domestically-produced I-2, I-5, I-15, I-16, and I-153 entered the Red Army inventory in the 1920-1930's...

Fighter aviation rapidly developed on the eve and during the course of the Second World War. Yak-1, Yak-7, Yak-9, Yak-3, LaGG-3, La-5, La-7, MiG-3 and others were developed. The improvement of aircraft occurred simultaneously with the development of jet engines at the end of the 1940's and beginning of the 1950's. The MiG-15, MiG-17, MiG-19, MiG-21, Yak-23, Yak-25, La-15, Su-7, Su-9 and Su-15 fighters were developed. We can include the MiG-23 and MiG-25 among the most modern fighter aircraft. The super-modern MiG-29 and Su-27 aircraft are currently in the Air Force inventory.

We must also state that such types of aircraft as fighter-bombers (Su-7B, Su-17M4, and MiG-27) and fighter-interceptors (MiG-25P, MiG-31, and Su-27) appeared during the course of the development of aviation.

Just what is a modern fighter? It is a supersonic, single-seat (more rarely twin-seat) aircraft with a pressurized cockpit and crew rescue systems (ejection seat). It serves to destroy manned and unmanned aircraft in the air. The fighter's aircraft weapons and onboard equipment provide the capability to accomplish missions at a significant distance from base areas (500-700 km or more) at low and high (over 20 km) altitudes from the forward and rear hemispheres, in any weather, during the day or at night.

One of the primary requirements for a fighter is high maneuverability that is needed to conduct air-to-air combat. Fighters can develop high G-loads (up to 8-10 G's), high rates of climb (250-350 meters per second), a speed at sea level of up to 1,500 kilometers per hour and, at high altitudes—2,000-3,000 kilometers per hour.

Fighters employ guided and unguided aircraft missiles and rapid-fire cannons to destroy targets (airborne and ground-based). Weapons guidance is carried out using radar, infrared and optical gunsights which permit the destruction of targets in the clouds and at night. Flight-navigation suites with computers for manual, semiautomatic and automatic control of the aircraft and weapons are being installed on fighter aircraft.

A competition for primacy in the sphere of aircraft production has occurred between countries, and first of all between the Soviet Union, Germany, and the United States, during the course of the entire development of aviation.

We have become accustomed to finding fault with our past on any matter. But, as they say, the old ways are the best ways. Fighters of the highest class that do not lag behind and at times even surpass the best world models

were developed both during the years of the Great Patriotic War and later in the Soviet Union. Here are some examples.

Yak-3 fighters began to reach the front in 1943. Its flight range was 900 kilometers. It reached speeds of up to 720 kilometers per hour. This was the lightest and most maneuverable fighter of the Second World War. Pilots of the "Normandy-Neman" Regiment flew the Yak-3. A total of 4,848 aircraft of this type were produced.

The MiG-15 fighter, which later had the opportunity to participate in the Korean War, took off for the first time

in 1947. Having an engine of approximately the same output as the American F-86 Saber aircraft, the MiG-15 was significantly lighter and that's why it also had a better rate of climb and higher altitude. The MiG-15's weaponry consisted of three cannons and unguided rocket projectiles were suspended under the wing. The Saber had only a six-barrel machinegun.

Many other Soviet fighters were also not surpassed. Let's take the modern MiG-29 and Su-27. Here are their comparative data with their American counterparts (Tables 1 and 2).

Table 1

| Type of Aircraft | Su-27 | F-15A | F-15C |
|--|--------|--------|--------|
| Tactical Technical Specifications | | | |
| Take-off Weight, kg | 22,600 | 18,800 | 20,500 |
| Maximum speed, kph | 2,400 | 2,450 | 2,450 |
| Service ceiling, meters | 17,800 | 18,300 | 17,900 |
| Flight range without external fuel tanks, km | 2,250 | 2,270 | 2,650 |
| Number of targets tracked simultaneously | 10 | 1 | 1 |

Table 2

| Type of Aircraft | MiG-29 | F-16A | F-16C |
|--|--------|--------|--------|
| Tactical Technical Specifications | | | |
| Take-off Weight, kg | 14,850 | 10,800 | 11,100 |
| Maximum speed, kph | 2,375 | 2,100 | 2,100 |
| Service ceiling, meters | 17,500 | 18,500 | 17,000 |
| Flight range without external fuel tanks, km | 1,430 | 2,000 | 2,000 |
| Number of targets tracked simultaneously | 10 | 1 | 10 |

As we see, based upon the primary indicators, our fighters do not lag behind the best American models in any way. Moreover, having a high thrust to weight ratio and an original airframe design, the MiG-29 and Su-27 can accomplish those aerobatic maneuvers that are needed for battle ("tail slide" [whip stall] and "Pugachev's cobra") which similar aircraft from across the ocean are incapable of accomplishing.

For example, MiG-29 tests were conducted in Germany before accepting them into the inventory. The MiG-29 won the majority of duels during the course of practice dogfights against the primary models of the western countries' fighter aviation (the F-15 Eagle, F-16 Fighting Falcon, the Tornado, and the F-4E Phantom).

So, the Russian Air Force has first class fighters in its inventory and it would appear that it has nothing to worry about. But let's analyze the situation. With the breakup of the Soviet Union, only one third of the former powerful fighter aviation formation remained within the Russian Air Force. But even those aircraft that are in the inventory right now take off much more rarely. Aviation subunits sit down to a starvation diet

due to the shortage of aviation fuel, spare parts and other expendable materials. Matters have reached the point that some pilots donate "their" flying hours to others so that at least someone can be adequately trained to accomplish missions in the air.

But then again, what are we worried about? The voices from the high rostrums state that the Cold War has ended, allegedly no one intends to attack us and so why should we be alarmed about the problems of fighter aviation? But experience indicates: any state, even one 100 times smaller than Russia, cares about the security of its air borders. Such a small country as Finland, for example, has 52 Air Defense fighters in its effective combat strength and Turkey has 151 fighters in the inventory. And how many does Russia need with a territory of 17,075,000 square kilometers?

That is not an idle question. But I had the opportunity to listen to one deputy's speech. He said we need to have that army that we will be able to maintain. That would be logical. But isn't this thesis more logical: we need an army that will be able to defend us. And if it will not be able to do that, then in general why maintain it?

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This also relates to fighter aviation. It's a matter for the experts to calculate how many aircraft we need. I would like to say that fighter aviation units and subunits have more than enough problems right now.

I have already mentioned the shortage of aviation fuel and spare parts. There are shortages of many other things. In other subunits, the question is being raised not about high combat readiness but about combat readiness in general. Of course, the Armed Forces are not at fault for this, that is their fate. Just like the fate of all of the Armed Forces that are suffocating from inadequate and, moreover, ill-timed financing.

And something else. Time is not standing still. Continuous weapons modernization is occurring in the United States and other leading countries. In 1988, the Americans confirmed the existence of a super-secret Stealth technology fighter [several words unreadable]. It received the designation F-117A (previously known as the F-19). This stealth aircraft was utilized against Iraq during Operation Desert Storm and totally confirmed the previously announced capabilities to penetrate the Air Defense system and accurately destroy targets under combat conditions. Specifically, these aircraft totaled only 2.5% of the total number of the formation's combat aircraft. Under conditions of the opposition of Iraq's Air Defense system, they conducted strikes against more than 40% of the targets assigned for destruction during the first days of the operation (Air Defense system command and control centers, command posts and communications hubs).

Improvement of other weapons also continues in the leading countries. And what about us? Based upon the MiG-29 and Su-27 aircraft, design bureaus have developed aircraft with such profound modernization that they are actually new aircraft. Based upon their combat capabilities, they surpass by a factor of 1.5-2 those aircraft which are currently in the Russian Army inventory.

That is, we have the potential capability to significantly increase the combat specifications of fighter aviation through the introduction of similar aircraft into the line. But... the problem is still the same: there is no money. The Air Force has not received a single fighter during the last three years. And the aircraft fleet is both physically and morally obsolete.

A paradox is resulting. We have design bureaus that are capable of developing high-class fighters. We have production capacity that is capable of producing them in adequate quantities. But all of this know-how remains unclaimed. Such are the consequences of the economic chaos that currently reigns in our country.

Ties Between Air Force, Geophysical Institute in Kabardino-Balkar

95UM0125A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Dec 94 p 4

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Dmitriy Kushnir, Air Force Press Center, under the rubric: "Cooperation": "The Pilots Have Become Friends With the Scientists"]

[FBIS Translated Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA already reported that Air Force fighter and ground attack aircraft carried out missile launches during tests of a new precision-guided weapon in North Caucasus Military District. At that time, Colonels Oleg Antonovich, Vladimir Kaganov, and Sergey Seregin, pilots from the State Flight Test Center imeni V.P. Chkalov (GLITs), and Test-Pilot Marat Alykov from the ANPK [Aircraft Scientific Production Complex] imeni A.I. Mikoyan worked against ground-based targets in MiG-29 and MiG-29M fighter aircraft for the first time under difficult weather conditions.

Test pilots Colonel Vladimir Bukhtoyarov and Vladimir Bondarenko carried out launches in Su-25 ground attack aircraft right after them. We must assess this fact as the next link in the strengthening chain of ties between the Air Force and the Vysokogornyy Geophysics Institute which is in the Kabardino-Balkar Republic.

Contacts between the aviators and the scientists were established a very long time ago, more than 15 years ago. And they have been maintained for all these years. However, now mutual interest has intensified. The current state of the economy has placed complex tasks before both parties: how to emerge from the situation that has developed with the least losses and maximum acquisitions under conditions of a chronic shortage of resources. It seems that ways still exist to solve the problem.

The military's interests are obvious here. The institute has test ranges, that is, a unique capability to test aircraft, carefully study the issues of the search for and rescue of crews that have experienced a disaster, and study the mechanism of the dissemination of radio waves under various weather conditions. Finally, it arranges the existence of controlled airspace.

Does a potential partner gain from cooperation that it will give to Kabardino-Balkariya itself? Quite a bit, thinks Colonel-General of Aviation Abrek Ayulov, Russian Air Force deputy commander-in-chief. The republic's budget could be adjusted depending on the concluded agreements. Furthermore, the Air Force is capable of rebuilding Nalchik Airport. We must also not rule out the possibility of cargo transport movements by military transport aviation aircraft. Yes and the creation of additional jobs for residents of the mountain kray are a sufficiently weighty argument in favor of a probable alliance under conditions of the economic crisis. And one more thing: the overall level of science in the republic will also increase with practically a total absence of state appropriations.

Is this not a solution for that same Vysokogornyy Geophysical Institute? Is it permissible to miss this chance and not take advantage of the military's scientific potential and technical capabilities? The Air Force has at its disposal—unmanned aircraft with the appropriate equipment that are suitable for flights in storm clouds containing hail. These aircraft are specially equipped to

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study aircraft with a "ceiling" of up to 29 kilometers. We can more effectively affect cloud processes using these aircraft than from the ground.

There is a highly effective apparatus to determine the ecological characteristics of various objects. In short, the Air Force is capable of rendering invaluable assistance in the resolution of the overwhelming majority of missions faced by the institute. Let's include here prediction of the weather situation, detection of dangerous natural phenomena at an early stage and monitoring the effectiveness of an active influence on hydrometeorological processes, carrying out aerial photography, and monitoring the state of the environment, the utilization of ground plots and the state of sowing, discharges into the air environment and their impact on man.

The joint program will certainly require appropriate financing. Obviously, expenditures must be shared proportionally between the RF Ministry of Defense, the RF Ministry for Civil Defense Affairs, Emergency Situations and Recovery from Natural Disasters, and the Russian Federal Service on Hydrometeorology and Environmental Control. However, we think that in any case the return will exceed the expenditures.

NAVAL FORCES

State Testing of SU-27 Carrier Based Flight Operations Completed

95UM0110A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
5 Jul 94 p 1

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent Viktor Litovkin: "Admiral Kuznetsov Takes on Wings"]

[FBIS Translated Text] State tests of the multipurpose SU-27K aircraft of the Sukhoy OKB [experimental design bureau] are coming to an end on the aircraft-carrying cruiser Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Nikolay Kuznetsov, which is located in the Barents Sea.

Four fighter-bombers, piloted by Sergey Melnikov, the firm's test pilot (130 landings on the deck of the Kuznetsov), and pilots of the 929th State Flight Test Center Colonel Nikolay Diordits and Colonel Aleksandr Rayevskiy (80 and 50 landings, respectively), have already mastered the floating airfield, and another 48 aircraft that are ready to go to sea together with the cruiser are awaiting an act of the state commission on acceptance of the aircraft into the Naval aviation inventory.

The cruiser's sailors have been waiting almost five years from the day of construction in the Nikolayev shipyard for the appearance of wings on the cruiser, and they are already there. Of course, it is necessary for the Navy's ordinary pilots to master the aircraft and feel at home on the sea-going airfield just as well as the test pilots. Some of them are already able to do this, and others have flown out to train in Crimea, to the city of Saki, where a

full-scale model of the "floating airfield" has been set up. The other day the military departments of two countries—Russia and Ukraine—finally reached an agreement on the lease by the Northern Fleet of the Black Sea air base.

Rear Admiral Viktor Lyakin, commander of the missile ship formation of which the Admiral Kuznetsov is a part, told an IZVESTIYA correspondent that starting this year the flagship of the Russian Navy will conduct a full operational training program.

Carriers To Be Broken Up in South Korea

95UM0099A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 16 Nov 94 p 11

[Article by Vadim Bratukhin and Aleksandr Safronov: "Russia's Symbols of Naval Might Scrapped"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Conflicting information in foreign and certain Russian mass media about the sale of two aircraft carriers that were part of the Pacific Fleet has now been clarified. The Pacific Fleet press center announced yesterday that the Russian Defense Ministry's Central Administration for Material Resources, which has an office in Vladivostok, had decided to sell a number of retired ships of the Pacific Fleet, including the aircraft carriers (in the Russian classification system, aircraft-carrying cruisers) *Minsk* and *Novorossiysk*.

In addition to the aircraft carriers, the vessels sold for scrap included several patrol and antisubmarine ships. They had all been part of the Pacific Fleet but subsequently became unusable. In particular, the main engine of the fleet's former flagship, the *Minsk*, went out of commission during a cruise several years ago, and repairing or replacing it proved impossible.

The aircraft carriers *Minsk* and *Novorossiysk* were placed in service in the Pacific Fleet in September 1978 and August 1982, respectively. They were retired from the fleet in June of last year. Two other ships of the same type (the *Baku* and the *Kiev*) are part of the Northern Fleet. The total displacement of each ship is 43,000 metric tons, the length is 273 meters, and the top speed 32 knots (59 km/hour). The aviation group consists of 36 vertical-takeoff and landing Yak-38 fighters and Ka-27 and Ka-32 antisubmarine helicopters. The ships are also equipped with surface to air, antisubmarine, and anti-ship missiles. In terms of their combat performance characteristics, they are inferior to American aircraft carriers but superior to their British and French counterparts.

The Russian Navy's Chief Technical Administration reported that ships of this class should undergo shipyard maintenance one every five years. Of them, however, only the *Kiev* underwent maintenance and repairs at the Nikolayev shipyard once during the time it was in service. There are no shipyards capable of such work in the region where the ships are based, and the fleet does not have its own capability to carry out shipyard repairs.

Although the fleet needs the aircraft carriers, there is no money to repair them. In view of the lack of funds, administration officials said, it was decided to retire the ships from the fleet. A spokesman for the Kompas company, Vasily Gorbarets, told a KOMMERSANT-DAILY correspondent that under the terms of the transaction, some of the ships will be cut up for scrap in Russia, the rest will be sent to South Korea for this purpose. Mr. Gorbarets refused to disclose the value of the transaction, a list of the ships that Kompas bought, or any other information about the company. He reported only that 60 percent of the foreign currency proceeds from the transaction will be returned to the fleet. This money is to be used to build housing for servicemen and members of their families.

KOMMERSANT-DAILY experts point out that this write-off of aircraft carriers is not unique. A decision was taken earlier to scrap the unfinished nuclear-powered aircraft carrier *Ulyanovsk*. Russia does not have the money to maintain the aircraft-carrying ships. Consequently, only one aircraft carrier of the latest design, the Admiral Kuznetsov, is in service, while a second ship of this series, the uncompleted *Varyag*, was never placed in service in the fleet.

Reexamination of Reforming Black Sea Fleet

95UM0096A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Nov 94 p 5

[Article by Reserve Admiral Aleksey Kalinin, commander of the Black Sea Fleet in 1983-1985, and Candidate of Military Science Georgiy Morozov: "Problem: How To Reform the Black Sea Fleet: Modern and Inexpensive Naval Forces Can Ensure the Security of Russia and Ukraine"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The problems of the Army and the Armed Forces in general, military doctrines and defense budgets, and the history of warfare and weapons have long been a focus of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA. The editors have amassed a large quantity of articles on all these subjects, and we are simply unable to physically publish many of them in our issues.

In an effort to somehow streamline our work in this area, we are introducing with this issue a new permanent rubric that will appear once a week, on Thursdays, as a rule, on page five of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA. We are calling the rubric "Wars and Armies." The rubric debuts today.

The situation involving the Black Sea Fleet has changed dramatically in the past year. From direct confrontation and plans to divide it, most politicians are now leaning toward the idea of a unified fleet in the Black Sea. With the election of the new Ukrainian president, this solution to the problem is becoming a reality. There are several reasons for this.

First, the economic burden of maintaining a combat-ready fleet at this time of economic collapse is beyond the where that of any single country.

Second, we cannot delude ourselves into thinking that the situation has become so secure that we can leave the southwestern maritime sector undefended. There are no grounds for such an assessment. On the contrary, Turkey is engaged in a military buildup, including a naval buildup. It is becoming increasingly involved in efforts to solve problems in the Transcaucasus and the Black Sea, and it has unilaterally altered the international 1936 Montreux convention on navigation in the Black Sea straits. Installations on the territory of Moldova, southern Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, and the Caucasus remain within range of Tomahawk missiles and the deck-based aviation of the U.S. Sixth Fleet. Bulgaria and Romania, our former allies, are leaning toward NATO. And Georgia is too preoccupied with other problems to care about the fleet.

Washington politicians are making incredible efforts, including efforts that include telling lies, to prevent the former Soviet republics from reuniting, albeit on a new basis. They are especially zealous in this with respect to Ukraine and Belarus, lecturing them and using handouts in an attempt to ensnare them.

Under these circumstances, it would be criminal to destroy the Black Sea Fleet and deprive ourselves of the sole force capable of providing cover from strikes from the southern maritime sector of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The time has come, and conditions for this have ripened, for the leaders of the CIS and their military commanders to meet and affirm the need to have a unified Black Sea Fleet that would be a part of their collective security system and be under Russian jurisdiction. Russia should assume the lion's share of the expense of maintaining the fleet. The other states would contribute what they can to maintaining its viability, increasing their contributions as their economies grow stronger.

At the same time, it is essential to come to a decision as to what form the Black Sea Fleet should take. It is currently aging before our eyes, and we must use this to take a fundamentally new approach to its formation. The Black Sea Fleet should have diversified forces of a new quality. In terms of strength, the fleet could be smaller and have something on the order of half of its current number of ships and patrol boats and about two-thirds of its current fleet of airplanes and helicopters, armed with standardized missiles for destroying surface ships and submarines, as well as artillery and antiaircraft guns.

In view of the fact that building ships is an immense strain on countries whose economies are already experiencing drastic production downturns and grave financial crises, we must now devise a clear-cut concept for maintaining the fleet's combat potential in the long term and thereby ensure parity at sea.

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Proceeding from the existing missions, it would be advisable for the fleet to retain and upgrade all existing branches of forces. In the process, however, it is necessary to revise their specific makeup in accordance with these missions.

As regards surface ships, there is no need for the Black Sea to have large surface ships such as aircraft-carrying and missile cruisers of the Slava and Moskva class. They should be replaced by light-weight, fast-moving, standardized missile-armed forces designed to combat both surface ships and submarines. The operational volume of the Black Sea is such that maintaining large ships in it is an unaffordable luxury and is not in keeping with military expediency. A small number of such ships should be kept in order to accomplish missions in the Mediterranean Sea and in ocean theaters.

In order to ensure freedom of navigation and to protect shipping in the Black Sea, there is an urgent need to augment the fleet with new and modern minesweepers capable of combating several types of mines simultaneously.

It is essential to reconsider and solve as quickly as possible the question of supplementing the submarine force with new and small submarines not inferior in terms of their performance specifications to the FRG's Project 209 submarines. Most of the Black Sea Fleet's submarines are hopelessly obsolete and lag behind the level of similar submarines of the NATO bloc.

The naval aviation forces should be reinforced with units of attack aircraft, which are very standardized and effective in combating fast-moving small targets and can be successfully used to repel enemy amphibious landings, to destroy installations, depots, and airfields on shore, to support amphibious landings and destroy ships (transports) at sea and in bases (ports), to destroy the enemy's observation and command and control system, to lay mines, and to conduct reconnaissance. The existence of several regiments of missile-armed aircraft within the air forces is not a defensive necessity. In view of the difficulty of reinforcing the fleet with new ships in the near future, its combat potential could be rapidly restored by means of attack aircraft.

In order to conduct UN-sponsored peacekeeping missions, the fleet's landing forces and naval infantry should be upgraded. This upgrading should take the form of developing ships using new design principles.

At the same time, infrastructure for ensuring the comprehensive viability of the fleet's forces and their basing, command and control systems, communications systems, and the system for protecting sea regions and basing areas should be maintained and upgraded.

Our economic difficulties should prompt us to search for methods to reduce expenditures on weapons production. One such method is to standardize missile armament. The fleet's ships, submarines, aviation, and on-shore

missile units are currently armed with many classes and types of missiles that are not compatible, something that necessitates large expenditures on their production, storage, repair, maintenance, and transport. Any kind of interchangeability is ruled out.

By standardizing these missiles, we could sharply enhance the skill levels of fleet seamen and service personnel at storage facilities and cut the cost of parts production and transport.

Combat potential could be enhanced in the long run by merging the intellectual potentials of the military-industrial complex. It would be useful to devise an integrated surface ship and submarine observation system for tracking and destroying enemy targets from the northern coast of the Black Sea. This system should use military satellites and long-range hydroacoustic monitoring along the entire coastline. It would be necessary to have on shore several offensive communication and computation centers with standardized weapons systems (for launching cruise missiles and missile-torpedoes) that would cover the entire water surface of the Black Sea, especially since the flight range of such missiles should be on the order of 800 kilometers. Such a system would make it possible to reduce the number of offensive and antisubmarine ships and make the accomplishment of missions and the use of weapons independent of weather conditions. This step would provide a substantial economic and military gain. In conjunction with an increase in the strength of attack aircraft, the placement of such systems on shore would make it possible to greatly reduce the strain in the costly shipbuilding program and to ease the heavy burden of expenditures on taxpayers. The situation in the fleet is currently such that an adjustment of a conceptual character is required.

The most important thing now is not to rapidly build many ships, but to build them in an economical and militarily expedient fashion, without reducing the potential of the fleet's forces in theater.

As for the present, we must take a balanced approach based on economic capabilities and military expediency. We must sharply alter the orientation toward reinforcing the auxiliary fleet and reduce its size by building standardized support ships and all-purpose supply ships.

In the long term, in order to spread out the Black Sea Fleet's ships, it will be necessary to study the economic feasibility of developing a new basing area in the Caucasus, in the vicinity of the Kiziltash estuary and the adjacent estuary north of Anapa. It would also be useful and economically beneficial to build a civilian port in that area, since Russia has a very great need for ports in the Black Sea today. Moreover, we already have experience in this. The port of Ilyichevsk and the naval base at Donuzlava were built under such conditions.

Consequently, the CIS is faced with the vital task of modernizing and accommodating the Black Sea fleet in keeping with the new conditions. In doing so, we must not neglect any aspect of its operation.

In connection with the changed conditions, the activities of politicians and staffs and the research of military departments should be directed not toward a mistaken and unwarranted division of the fleet, but toward the development and formation of the fleet in accordance with our defensive doctrine and in the interests of strengthening the defense of all the states of the Commonwealth.

Baltics: Former Liepaja Commander R-Adm Stalev Arrested

95UM0080C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 15 Nov 94 p 1

[Item from Moscow: "Investigation in Admiral's Case Is Under Special Control"]

[FBIS Translated Text] RIA—The Russian military procuracy confirmed the fact of the arrest of Rear-Admiral Valeriy Stalev, former commander of the Baltic Fleet naval base in the city of Liepaja.

The procuracy announced that he is accused of taking bribes in especially large amounts and of assisting Latvian commercial structures in the illegal acquisition of written-off Baltic Fleet property and decommissioned ships. The arrest was reported to Russian Federation Chief Military Procurator Valentin Panichev, who issued instructions to place the progress of the investigation in Admiral Stalev's case under special control.

Baltic Fleet Procuracy Investigates Corruption

95UM0107A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Nov 94 p 2

[Article by Capt. First Rank Valeriy Gromak under "Returning to What Was Published" rubric: "As Much as the String Is Twisted...the Military Procuracy of the Baltic Fleet Is Investigating the Actions of 'Businessmen' in Uniform"]

[FBIS Translated Text] I visited Liyepaya at the beginning of the summer. The last warships were leaving their last base in Latvia. I looked with bitterness at the abandoned buildings of the barracks, training centers, multi-story housing, and half-sunk ships. I saw the tears in the eyes of people whose further fate remained in question and I heard them utter bitter and angry words about individual "businessmen" in uniform, who got rich on this withdrawal that is more like flight...."

The army and navy are supposed to serve the god of war Mars rather than the god of commerce Mercury. And KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has repeatedly defended this theme. Here are the titles of some articles on this subject: "Businessmen Against Their Will. Passions About the Property of the Baltic Fleet" (28 November 1991), "They Counted and Started to Cry" (19 February 1992), "Scandalous Affairs" (17 April 1992), "A Fever of Copper and Brass Is Shaking the Baltic Fleet" (2 June

1992), "A Vein of Gold" (16 February 1993).... There they talked about the selling off of the property of the Baltic Fleet in the countries of the Baltic and about the negligent and even criminal actions of military "businessmen." Not until 1992 did the procuracy of the Baltic Fleet initiate about 20 criminal cases on illegal entrepreneurship of officers. The guilty persons were punished.

In the summer of last year, Lt. Col. Nikolay Buyanov, the authorized agent of the Central Directorate for Material Resources and Foreign Economic Relations of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, came to Riga. And they sighed with relief in the Baltic Fleet: finally the receipts from the sale of property will pass through some hands and the fleet will obtain the funds that it so greatly needs for the construction of housing.

But they did not sell by any means everything—some of the ships of the Baltic Fleet remained in Latvia even after our departure. From time to time local newspapers publish photographs of ship graveyards and naturally they name the amount of the economic damage inflicted on Latvia. And today, in analyzing and investigating all of the documents having to do with the sale of military property of the Northwest Group of Forces and the Baltic Fleet, you come to the conclusion that the mechanism of this sale was not completely thought out, although there were various guiding documents.

And this became the basis for abuses, theft, and other kinds of official crimes. How, for example, can one explain the fact that Lt. Col. Buyanov sold five ships to one firm for \$536 as scrap metal. Or how does the following deal relate with common sense? The large antisubmarine ship "Obraztsovyy" was located in Liyepaya from 1987 through 1993 for repairs. And they spent more than 26 million rubles of the taxpayers for its repair and for the renovation of mechanisms and communication systems. Last year, however, the large antisubmarine ship was written off the fleet forces and sold to a foreign firm as scrap metal, whereby Russia did not receive a cent. The ship was sold with the personal participation of Rear Adm. Valeriy Stalev, chief of Liyepaya Garrison.

Take the question of the supplying of coal to the military units of the air defense system located in the Baltic region. Here "businessmen" in uniform also invented a simple system: knowing that a military unit would soon be eliminated, they had a year's supply of coal delivered there. And then, when the unit was eliminated, the coal dissolved, as did the billions that were used to pay for this coal.

But it is not without reason that there is the popular saying: as much as the string is twisted.... The procuracy of the Baltic Fleet, which is headed by Maj. Gen. of Justice Nikolay Goncharenko, is doing a lot of work today to investigate the criminal cases of officers serving

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in the Northwest Group of Forces and in the Baltic Fleet. As of today, under Article 173 of Part 3 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, they have arrested and accused Lt. Col. Nikolay Buyanov, authorized agent of the Central Directorate for Material Resources and Foreign Economic Relations of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation; Rear Adm. Valeriy Stalev, former senior naval chief of Liyepaya Garrison; Maj. Oleg Shirokikh, chief of the quarters and utilities unit of the Liyepayskiy Rayon air defense.... In the course of the investigation, they have already revealed instances of their abuse of their official positions for selfish purposes and embezzlement. Part of the property of the fleet and Northwest Group of Forces was transferred not to Latvian authorities, as required by treaty, but to groups of businessmen. Naturally they did not do this for nothing.... When selling an airplane or ship, that same Lt. Col. Buyanov drew up competing lists of possible buyers. In the course of the investigation, however, it was revealed that these lists did not correspond to reality and the firm that won the competition was the one that gave a bribe....

The investigation has only begun and there are many parts to it. It is still too early to talk about much of it. There are a number of difficulties, including with the trip of auditors from Moscow to the Baltic countries. Under the existing statute, today only the Ministry of Defense can give approval for the payment of their trips. And apparently there is someone in Moscow who does not want to report to the minister of defense that the procuracy of the Baltic Fleet has arrested bribe takers and that it is necessary to investigate on site. And this is slowing things down.

But there is something else about this story that has me on guard. Can it be that these Buyanovs, Stalevs, and Shirokikhs engaged in their commercial affairs in a complete vacuum? Just a year ago, reports from Liyepaya Garrison on illegal deals with copper ship propellers (they told about this in the fleet newspaper) reached all the official channels. It was no secret for anyone in Liyepaya that an entire artillery battery was turned over to a local metallurgical plant and the state did not receive even a kopeck for it. Many saw depots of storage batteries one and a half kilometers long, which later just evaporated somewhere.

It is difficult to say why many officials, knowing about these and others facts, remained silent. Just as it is difficult to explain the fact that only the arrest of Rear Adm. Stalev prevented him from occupying the place of deputy commander of the Baltic Fleet—the documents for his appointment were already in Moscow.

"As long as the investigation is under way," says the military procurator Mikhail Ioffe from a department of the procuracy of the Baltic Fleet, "much cannot be said. But people must know that justice will prevail and that the criminals will be punished...."

It may be that someone will ask why a military newspaper is telling about all this and why it is spilling these

disgraceful facts on its pages. Is this appropriate when many organs of the press are accusing military people, right up to the minister of defense, of various crimes without any proof? I am convinced that if the facts are proven one must write about them so that lessons can be drawn for the future and the armed forces purified from the spirit of commercialism. And also so that statesmen will understand that one cannot lead the army to extremes and push military people into crime because of their impoverished existence.

REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Defense Agricultural Chief on Food Supply Problems

95UM0079B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 15 Nov 94 p 2

[Interview with Colonel Fedor Vladimirovich Druzhinin, chief of Agricultural Directorate of Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Central Food Directorate, by Ivan Ivanyuk, date, place and occasion not specified, under rubric "The Budget and the Army: What Is Behind the Cost Figures?": "Military Agricultural Workers Themselves Survive and Help the Troops Survive"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Ministry of Defense cost estimate also includes an amount for requirements for appropriations of military sovkhozes, which now simply are called "agricultural enterprises." It is around R60 billion for 1994. On learning of this, people who are far from the problems of agriculture begin saying: Why does the Army need such "proprietors," who must be maintained to boot? And straight off they suggest eliminating them.

Well, just what are military agricultural enterprises—producers or consumers? It was this question, at first glance a strange one, that began our conversation with Colonel Fedor Druzhinin, chief of Agricultural Directorate of Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Central Food Directorate.

[Druzhinin] That is the whole point (Fedor Vladimirovich explained), that we represent producers of specific products, of which there are not that many in the Armed Forces. There presently are 103 agricultural enterprises functioning in the Ministry of Defense. Almost half were shifted from the national agroindustrial complex to the care of the military department in the last three years, not only to preserve collective ownership, as some are convinced, but also in the desire to have a guaranteed market, the Army and Navy, for the sale of products, a market for which, by the way, all world states now are struggling.

Well then, our farms meticulously pay taxes (there are 15 descriptions of them!) to federal and local budgets. Accordingly, they are authorized various kinds of subsidies and compensations, which come to them through the military budget. Small amounts for construction also

are allocated centrally. Under our conditions these are pitiful crumbs when we consider that expenses for agricultural production are subsidized approximately 40 percent by the state in the majority of developed countries. In addition, we all know how heavily the Ministry of Defense budget has been cut of late. And one and a half months before the end of the year we had been allocated only R19 billion.

But even this is only half the trouble, as they say; there is also its other half. In accordance with Russian Federation Presidential edicts and Russian Government decrees, no less than half of the funds owed as payment for products of crop growing should go to the farms (to military farms too, naturally) beforehand. This is on paper, but in fact as of 1 October the debt to our enterprises for products already turned over was more than R18 billion. As a result, their accounts payable for POL alone was R8 billion.

The situation is exacerbated by the fact that prices for industrial products in the country are growing almost two times faster than for agricultural products. In the first half year, for example, the former grew an average of 7.4 times and the latter only by 4.5 times. Being constantly in this financial vise, military producers are in no position to purchase equipment and fertilizers, and in some cases even to pay their workers' wages on time.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] So perhaps it is really simpler to buy food products from outside producers?

[Druzhinin] It is not simpler. Here one has to take into account at the very least two circumstances. The first is that military farms are located next to military formations and large strategic formations, i.e., troops are supported by farm products on a territorial principle, which permits sharply reducing transportation expenses. And it is simply impossible to supply some things such as fresh milk to the Northern Fleet for submariners from other regions of the country at any price. And agricultural enterprises of the Far Eastern Military District [MD], Pacific Fleet and others, for example, are guarantors of the delivery of potatoes and vegetables to remote Far North and Arctic garrisons. Thus a certain autonomy is supported in supplying troops with food products.

The Ministry of Defense now probably is the biggest debtor in the country. And in this situation, as I already said, military farms turned over R18 billion worth of farm products to the troops without any prepayment.

I also will add that, alas, the food problem in this country is not being resolved as quickly as one would like. Meat, milk and egg production has dropped significantly and the number of head of cattle and poultry is falling...

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] And in your view, what causes that situation?

[Druzhinin] As was correctly noted at one time, agriculture can be managed without subtleties, but it does not

tolerate stupidities. Those reforms which began in Russia's agrarian sector in 1991 are second-rate in my view. They very much resemble the collectivization campaign of the 1930's. Where are the farmers on whom so many hopes were placed? Unfortunately, the necessary infrastructure just was not created for their normal work.

All this tells, and very painfully, on the Armed Forces' supply of food products. The personnel in some military units lately have been issued kissel because of a shortage of sugar and canned stewed meat or fish because of the absence of meat. Were it not for emergency supplies, which help out in extreme situations, and were it not for the military agricultural enterprises and subsidiary farms of military units, the troops would have had to tighten their belts, as they say. And that is how their products figure in the plan for supplying food to the Armed Forces.

For example, the Northern Fleet now is fully supported by its own vegetables. North Caucasus MD agricultural enterprises cover more than two-thirds of district needs for all kinds of farm products. Today we are really solving the problem of full support of the Army and Navy with flour, groats, vegetable oil, and fruit and vegetable preserves. We are looking at the question of stopping onion procurements in Central Asia; they can be grown in the necessary amount on farms located on the territory of the North Caucasus MD.

We now also produce practically 100 percent of the milk requirement, but only around 30 percent of it is supplied to the troops, since it is a perishable product. Now the decision has been made to build three dairies in 1995 to produce condensed milk and other milk products with a lengthy storage period. This also will allow overcoming the monopolism of local dairies, which receive milk from farms with a fat content of 3.5-4 percent at a price of R150-180 per liter, then dilute it by half, but raise the price, conversely, by five times, and so on.

At the same time, we did not get by without working in fits and starts when a decision was made at one time to increase the production of farm products in the Ministry of Defense and a harvest began under banners of "civilian" sovkhozes and kolkhozes which displayed initiative. Along with farms that for the most part were strong, such as Malyus and Zelenchuk (North Caucasus MD) and Kirshinskiy (Leningrad MD), frankly weak sovkhozes also arrived "for duty." Thus, not having weighed everything as it should have, the Main Billeting Directorate took onto the balance sheet clear "outsiders" in their areas—farms located far from military consumers and having puny material-technical and everyday-social facilities. The return from them now is small and everyone has to rack their brains together over what to do with them.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] And how did the natural cataclysms with which this year abounded affect the work of Army and Navy agricultural workers?

[Druzhinin] This year really stood out as very difficult, probably the most difficult one over the last decade. Less grain than last year, 283,000 tonnes, and 63,000 tonnes of vegetables and potatoes were harvested, which is 80 percent of what was planned. At the same time, the introduction of mutually obligating contractual terms between military agricultural enterprises and military consumers permitted increasing the sale to the troops of meat by 1,761 tonnes, milk by 14,500 tonnes, eggs by 3 million and potatoes and vegetables by 6,300 tonnes compared with last year.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Insofar as I know, there is censure for the fact that your prices "bite." At times it is more advantageous to buy imported food products...

[Druzhinin] Of course, we constantly keep an eye on questions of price formation. We have to get used to the market even further, engage in marketing and study where to grow which products. Therefore an economic analysis team now has been formed in our directorate. I agree it is now possible to buy cheaper imported butter, say, but the fact is, it sometimes is worse than domestic margarine.

This is not only a matter of food quality, however, but again a matter of the laws of market economy. Any firm, including one specializing in food products, is interested in monopolizing the market, especially such a vast one as the Russian market. For the sake of this it is ready for any temporary costs and may fully establish dumping prices for a certain time. But later, when an opportunity appears to dictate these prices, you may be sure they will take off to an unattainable height. Such a scenario of the development of events is very close to reality under our conditions, when antimonopoly structures are only just getting on their feet. Other commodity producers, including military producers, will be simply ruined. And then most likely it will be necessary to place enormously larger amounts in the military budget to pay for food...

So should anyone now doubt the need for strengthening the position in the Army and Navy of the Russian agricultural producer, who is attempting to hold out amidst storms of the market economy? Now as never before, he needs support on the part of the Armed Forces command. In no instance can we permit the destruction of that which has been worked out over decades, otherwise, as already has happened, later it will be necessary to reestablish everything from scratch. And I would like to end with the words of the great Goethe: "The fall of thrones and kingdoms does not affect me, but a burned-down peasant farmstead is a true tragedy."

Loss of Civilian Employees Due to Low Pay

95UM0079A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Nov 94 p 1

[Article by Petr Altunin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, under rubric "View of a Problem": "The Army Is Losing Civilian Personnel"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Is it possible to picture the Russian Army without employees and workers? Today there are no fewer than around a million of them. Military enterprises and establishments, hospitals, polyclinics, military commissariats, food and clothing depots, fuel bases, military exchanges, mess halls, boiler rooms, auxiliary vessels—the Army simply cannot function and its combat readiness is inconceivable without these and other services where civilians make up the majority.

Workers and employees are people without shoulderboards, but they perform their duty selflessly on a level with those who wear them, and they value their affiliation with the Armed Forces; many have worked at their posts for decades and possess high skills.

"The Ministry of Defense has two wings," writes Nikolay Yemelyanov from a missile unit, "servicemen and we civilian personnel. Only, lately our wing has weakened a bit and soon may fracture. The pay is 100,000, and even less for billeting unit workers at depots. They promised free meals on alert duty, but this applied only to officers. The latter of course give their utmost, and we see this; some even take up posts as corporals of the guard and as sentries. But our lot is even worse."

Paradoxical as it may be, with the elevation of the role of workers and employees (they now fill 956 servicemen's positions), their everyday social situation has worsened sharply of late. While average monthly pay, counting established benefits, of workers of military units, establishments and enterprises on budgetary-estimate financing was 10 percent below that of workers in the national economy in December of last year, the gap widened to 23 percent in March of this year and to 44 percent in June. The contrast is even more striking in remuneration for labor at arsenals, bases and depots (R100,100 as against R292,200), in housing and communal services (R98,800 and R225,100 respectively), in higher educational institutions (R119,000 and R224,300) and so on.

And the country's enterprises and organizations use funds from commercial activity to remunerate for labor and they make additional payments by decisions of local authorities, which is totally absent under Ministry of Defense conditions.

But even this is not everything. A real disaster has continued for around a year: for two, three or more months Army and Navy workers and employees almost everywhere have not been paid, vacations have not been paid, allowances for children have not been given out and so on. Collectives at Air Force repair enterprises work a shortened work week because of a lack of financing. Implementation of social programs essentially has been curtailed and plants are not in a position to maintain residential compounds, children's preschool establishments and cultural facilities. Preparation for winter ended up on the brink of disruption.

It is the very same picture for repairmen, for example, at the Ussuri Tank Repair Plant subordinate to the Ground Troops, which is practically shutting down, and at ship repair yards where R14 billion in pay is owed.

All this affects the vital activity of the "second wing" in a most definite manner: workers simply are incapable of feeding families with the ever growing inflation, "black Tuesdays" and "gasoline" shocks, after which prices gallop irrepressibly. The drain of people from military organizations also is no accident. Often having worked there for their entire conscious life, having taken a fancy for the job, as they say, and having fallen in love with it, they part with tears in their eyes. As of 1 July billeting unit collectives were 24.2 percent under strength in workers, public health establishments 21.5 percent and bases and arsenals 20.8 percent. And some communal housing services organizations of Northern Fleet and Transbaykal and Siberian military districts are only at 20-50 percent strength. This creates a critical situation in organizing the everyday life of garrisons.

Are any efforts being made to resolve the acutely pressing problems? Yes, both on the part of the command element and (which is important to stress) on the part of Army trade unions. Spartak Arzhavkin, chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions of Russian Federation Armed Forces Civilian Personnel, and the heads of trade union central committees of branches of the Armed Forces persistently raise questions of the grievous state of workers and employees with main commissariats and with the Ministry of Defense, and they make the rounds of all high echelons with tariff agreements in hand, but it does no good. The Ministry of Defense hides nothing from them, shows all documents on receipt of financial resources, and utters two words: "No money."

Under the influence of people who have not been paid for months and who, much as they would like to, cannot get additional earnings from anywhere, the Federation of Trade Unions began writing petitions to the President, to the chairman of the government and to the State Duma, but as of yet there has been no response. It is true, in October a paper was received from the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance signed by Deputy Minister A. Samusev, who, with reference to "late receipt of taxes and payments to the federal budget," still offered the consolation that "in August or September of this year the debt for pay and wages has been fully repaid." But this was not so at all. As of the day the letter was received, wages unpaid to civilian personnel amounted to tens of billions of rubles. The circle had closed. It is vain to hope that this money still "will be found somewhere" by the Ministry of Defense. Now it does not know how to react to the latest "narrative problem" from the government: it turns out that money allocated by the federal budget for the earthquake in the Kuriles, R120 billion, must be charged to the Ministry of Defense account...

All these and other "hot facts" characterizing the present day of civilian personnel spilled out at a conference with

representatives of trade union central committees of branches of the Armed Forces, the active trade union membership, and heads of Ministry of Defense main and central directorates conducted by Colonel General Valeriy Mironov, Russian Federation deputy minister of defense. The discussion was heated, engrossing and businesslike. One more Appeal was adopted to the President of Russia and Russian Federation Government. This time they did not try appealing to the State Duma, which is stubbornly "oblivious" to the situation at hand. By the way, its representative, invited in advance, just did not appear at this conference as well...

Utility of Resubordination of Railroad Troops

95UM0111B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 30 Nov 94 p 1

[Interview with Aleksandr Dovgiallo, deputy of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, by Yuriy Spiridonov: "We Cannot Get Along Without Railroad Troops"]

[FBIS Translated Text] An edict of the President of the Russian Federation and a decree of the Government of the Russian Federation defining the status of the Railroad Troops of Russia were issued more than a year ago. The Federal Directorate of the Railroad Troops of the Russian Federation is now operating as an independent institution under the Ministry of Railways of Russia.

Civilian Aleksandr Dovgiallo, chief of one of the largest railroads of Russia and deputy in the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, shares his ideas on the consequences of structural reorganization and the prospects for the future.

[Spiridonov] Aleksandr Ivanovich, what, in your opinion, is the practical benefit from this reorganization?

[Dovgiallo] There is an unquestionable benefit both for the Ministry of Railways and for the Railroad Troops. The military railroaders provide for the technical coverage of installations of the Ministry of Railways, build new railroad lines, and rebuild outdated lines. The combining of the efforts of the two large agencies was dictated by new economic relations in which everyone is seeking a worthy business partner. The interests in strengthening the country's defensive capability also required this. In fulfilling the tasks in mobilization readiness, the Railroad Troops and Ministry of Railways are cooperating closely to guarantee uninterrupted transport work, which is especially important at this time, under the conditions of greater mobility of the army.

Their interests also coincide in the construction of facilities of the Ministry of Railways. The range of tasks of the troops is rather large. The main tasks are the technical covering of large railroad facilities, improving the viability of transportation arteries, the blocking and restoration of roads, and the building of new railway lines. The specific situation allows them to execute these

tasks while performing practical training work on actual rail transport facilities. This helps to improve the military and special skills of military railroaders and raise the combat and mobilization readiness of the troops.

The Ministry of Railways, in turn, is extremely interested in utilizing subunits of the Railroad Troops in the construction of its installations. This is explained primarily by the fact that in this difficult period the troops were able not only to maintain their infrastructure and material and technical base but also to develop them. This is strength. We cannot get along without the Railroad Troops.

[Spiridonov] Another factor was probably the fact that many organizations that were engaged in construction in the interests of the Ministry of Railways changed their form of ownership....

[Dovgyallo] Yes, and substantially. The transformation of the Ministry of Transport Construction into the state corporation "Transstroy" disrupted the overall system of transport construction in the country. After achieving independence and becoming joint-stock companies, many construction and installation trains and even trusts are gradually giving up traditional tasks and are beginning to handle extrinsic functions.

Meanwhile, we have inherited an enormous quantity of unfinished installations, many of which have great economic and strategic importance. In the Transbaykal Railroad, for example, the Zilovo-Ksenyevskaya section, the last on the entire Trans-Siberian Railroad, is now being electrified. Previously subdivisions of Glavbambstroy [Main Administration for the Construction of the Baykal-Amur Railroad Line] worked here but they dispersed when they all gained their "sovereignty." Another factor was the lack of financing and the difficult working conditions. They turned to the Railroad Troops with the request that they take on the unfinished work....

So they did fulfill their obligations. During 1993-94, they laid the contact system for a section with a total length of 81 km and they completed work in a 28-km section that was left by the joint-stock company "Glavbambstroy." With completion of the work, traffic will be opened on electric traction all the way from Moscow to Khabarovsk, a distance of about 9,000 km. The military railroaders are also electrifying the section Khabarovsk-Bikin on the Far East Road. Large railroad installations are being built in Kuzbass, Karelia, and in a number of other regions of the country.

[Spiridonov] Your work as a deputy in the Federal Assembly is linked with work in the Committee for Social Policy. How are the social problems of the military railroaders being resolved?

[Dovgyallo] Generally rather well. The harmonious system for the material and domestic support of people that developed over decades is clearly having an effect. The troops are building their own housing and are

financing and participating in the construction and reconstruction of schools, kindergartens, and structures for social and domestic support. Every year an average of about one-third of families without apartments receive comfortable new housing. Normal living conditions are being established at the places where the units and subunits are stationed. It is no accident that the question of contract recruiting is being resolved successfully in the troops.

The significant reinforcement in the form of the Railroad Troops of Russia has been invaluable for us during a difficult time for the Ministry of Railways. The military railroaders are appearing where civilian builders are giving up in the face of the volume of work and the living conditions.

Civil Defense Recommendations on Personal Security Training

95UM0112A Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA
in Russian No 5, 1994 p 14

[Recommendations under "Official Section" rubric: "Recommendations on the Realization of the Curriculum 'Bases of Personal Security'"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation

Ministry of the Russian Education on Matters of Civil Defense, Emergency Situations, and Dealing with the Consequences of Natural Disasters

Recommendations on the Realization of the Course Program "Bases of Personal Security"

In accordance with the requirements of Decree No 261 of the Council of Ministers and Government of the Russian Federation "On the Establishment of a Russian System for Warning and Action in Emergency Situations" from 18 April 1992 and Edict No 643 of the president of the Russian Federation "On Civil Defense" from 8 May 1993, the Ministry of Education and the State Committee for the Emergency Situation of Russia worked out a new curriculum "Bases of Personal Security."

The curriculum meets the requirements of the federal program "Training of the Population and Preparation of Specialists of the Agencies of State Administration of the Russian Federation and Emergency-Rescue Forces for Actions in Emergency Situations" and was developed taking into account the age physiological and psychological characteristics of the students and their training in nonspecialized institutions and in educational institutions for primary professional education. The curriculum provides for the familiarization of the students with the general characteristics of dangerous and harmful factors and emergency situations and their acquisition of knowledge and skills to protect life and health from their consequences.

In the process of the training, the students receive knowledge on the organization of the Russian system of warning and actions in emergency situations and on the defense of the state and the military obligation of citizens; they acquire practical skills in civil defense, on how to help themselves and each other, and on the bases of a healthy life style.

For the purpose of raising the level of training of the students and imparting to them knowledge in the area of personal security, the Ministry of Education of Russia and the Ministry of the Russian Federation on Matters of Civil Defense, Emergency Situations, and Dealing with the Consequences of Natural Disasters recommend that they be guided by the following in the realization of the new curriculum "Bases of Personal Security" in the indicated state educational institutions.

For the study of the "Bases of Personal Security" course, it is expedient to plan:

- not less than one hour a week in the nonspecialized institutions in all grades (from 1 through 9 and in the 11th) and two hours in the 10th grade;
- 140 hours in the entire period of instruction in the institutions of primary professional education.

We propose that the staffs for matters of civil defense and emergency situations and the educational administrative agencies of the Russian Federation organize the training and retraining of the instructors and organizers of the "Bases of Personal Security" in accordance with the new curriculum, that they give them practical and methodological assistance with respect to the annual planning, organization, and execution of a "Day for the Protection of Children" in accordance with the curriculum, and that they take measures to establish the necessary instructional and material base in the educational institutions in accordance with the list affirmed in the curriculum for the "Bases of Personal Security."

[Signed] M.N. Lazutova, deputy minister of education of the Russian Federation

15-M from 4 February 1994

[Signed] N.I. Burdakov, deputy chairman of the State Committee of the Russian Federation on Matters of Civil Defense, Emergency Situations, and Dealing with the Consequences of Natural Disasters

22-201-10 from 4 February 1994

UKRAINE

Commentary on Nonproliferation Treaty, Ukraine's Accession Thereto

95UM0089A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
18 Nov 94 p 1

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA commentator Captain Serhiy Zhurets under the rubric "Events": "The NPT Is Now Like an Order"]

[FBIS Translated Text] What has long been awaited—especially in the West—has now happened. The Supreme Soviet has ratified the Law of Ukraine "Accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty" by an overwhelming majority (301 to 8). Our country has become a full-fledged participant in the process of nonproliferation that was launched a quarter of a century ago.

Background Information

There are now than a hundred and sixty countries participating in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty since 1 July 1968. The aim of the treaty is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to maintain the necessary international monitoring of the fulfillment of the obligations the nations have assumed. Those obligations, for countries that have nuclear weapons, are associated with seeing that nuclear arms or nuclear explosive devices are not transferred to any other nation, and not assisting that process.

The obligations for the nonnuclear countries are not to develop, obtain or produce nuclear weapons.

An international conference will have to be held in 1995, at which time the fate of the NPT will be resolved—either its force will be extended for a certain period of time, or it will remain valid indefinitely.

Ukraine, however, has acceded to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty with a whole series of restrictions. Those restrictions take our own interests into account. This pertains to security guarantees first and foremost. Kiev, in acceding to the NPT, does not wish to be satisfied with the security mechanism that is already outlined by the treaty itself, namely the promises of the nuclear powers not to employ nuclear weapons against countries that do not possess those weapons. Kiev is demanding special guarantees for itself, in the form of a multilateral treaty between Ukraine and the nuclear countries. What was expressed in the restrictions has to be taken into account in that document:

"The threat of force or its use against the territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders or political independence of Ukraine on the part of any nuclear power, as well as the application of economic pressure directed at undermining the exercise by Ukraine of the rights

inherent in its sovereignty, will be considered by Ukraine as an exceptional circumstance that threatens its highest interests."

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Hennadiy Udovenko, who has already coordinated the draft of this document with Russia, the United States and Great Britain, emphasized that it conforms entirely to the interests of Ukraine. And there is historical precedent, in the opinion of Commission of the Supreme Soviet on Foreign Affairs and Ties with the CIS Countries Chairman Borys Oliynyk, for the fact that the nuclear powers first agree to give specific security guarantees.

As for the fundamental question of just when Ukraine will receive those security guarantees, the decision made would seem to have to satisfy all of the parties concerned. The transfer of the letter of ratification, which testifies to Ukraine's accession to the NPT, to the depositary countries is to take place during a session of the CFE that is planned to be held in Budapest in December of this year. The signing of the multilateral treaty that is to guarantee the security of Ukraine is also to take place at the same time.

Ukraine, aside from security guarantees, is trying to achieve a special status for itself through the restrictions, as a country that, on the one hand, has not entirely gotten rid of the nuclear legacy of the USSR but, on the other, cannot produce those weapons or support them with its own resources. President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma emphasized that very fact in his speech, since Ukraine has no capability for the safekeeping of nuclear weapons, while attempts to produce such weapons would make Ukraine so dependent on the nuclear powers that there could be no discussion even of its sovereignty. The special status, at the same time, must reserve for Kiev the right of ownership of the components of nuclear weapons as a material asset:

"Ukraine is the owner of nuclear weapons that it inherited from the former USSR. Ukraine, after the dismantling and destruction of the latter under monitoring and according to procedures that rule out the possibility of the reuse of the nuclear materials that are components of those weapons for their primary purpose, intends to employ the aforementioned materials exclusively for peaceful purposes. The presence of nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine before their complete elimination, as well as the corresponding work to maintain, service and eliminate them by the armed forces of Ukraine, does not contravene the provisions of the Treaty."

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, with its categorical bipolar division of the participating countries into nuclear and nonnuclear, it is true, does not define at all the status of a nonnuclear country with such rights. The chairman of the Commission of the Supreme Soviet on Issues of Nuclear Policy and Nuclear Security, Mykhaylo Pavlovskyy, indicated in a discussion with me on this score that "If there is no such status, then it must be introduced." To my question of whether pressure on

Ukraine will not be a consequence of the attempts of Kiev to gain special status, Mykhaylo Pavlovskyy indicated, "Everything we haven't done has always led to pressure. We are now trying to see that the pressure will be minimal."

The restrictions, however, nonetheless do not include those that were being discussed the day before at a joint session of the Commission on Issues of Defense and State Security and the Commission on Foreign Affairs and Ties With the CIS Countries. The discussion there, among other things, concerned the fact that all of the spending associated with the accession of Ukraine to the NPT would have to be made at the expense of the Western countries. The terms of the NPT, after all, are also quite expensive and exacting. Kiev will thus have to assume the obligation of providing guarantees of the safekeeping of materials that are undergoing fission. (There are currently, according to preliminary estimates, more than five thousand tonnes of special materials that are undergoing fission at the enterprises of various ministries and agencies of Ukraine, including nuclear power plants.) This will require the creation of an effective system of accounting and monitoring of the nuclear materials, as well as the presence of a special state body that would have to provide all essential information to the IAEA. A whole series of these measures would have to be carried out within eighteen months after the accession of Ukraine to the NPT.

This, however, is the start of another story altogether. The period can by rights be put, however, to the story of the nuclear Ukraine, which has lasted for almost three years.

Path Toward Nonproliferation Accession, Turn Toward Europe

Support for Nonproliferation Treaty

95UM0077A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
10 Nov 94 p 1

[Unattributed news item: "We Will Support the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "There was never any doubt that Ukraine would join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty," said Supreme Soviet of Ukraine Chairman Oleksandr Moroz at a meeting with the ambassadors of the Scandinavian countries. And he added, "This is only a technical matter. But it should not be forgotten that the nuclear potential of Ukraine is part of its economy. We thus need concrete reciprocal steps on the part of the world community."

The head of the parliament expressed his opinion on the score of the program of economic development of Ukraine that has been proposed by the president. He emphasized that the Supreme Council is ready for reforms. "We must strengthen the system of economic operation in the country, but the reforms must proceed

by legal means and not using decrees," said Oleksandr Moroz. As for privatization, Oleksandr Moroz stated that "We should not copy Russia, but rather rely more on a Western model."

Security Guarantees in Light of Nonproliferation Treaty

95UM0077B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
12 Nov 94 p 1

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA commentator Serhiy Zhurets under the "Point of View" rubric: "Ukraine and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: Will the Security Guarantees Satisfy Kiev?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The Supreme Council of Ukraine is to consider the question of ratifying the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty before Leonid Kuchma makes an official visit to Washington. There are grounds to feel, however, that even in the event that Ukraine joins the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the decision will be reminiscent of the first attempt to ratify the START-I treaty. Ukraine at that time advanced a whole series of restrictions that did not please either the West or Russia. What awaits this time?*

The deadline for Ukraine to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty has fundamental significance for Leonid Kuchma from this point on. The amount of the financial assistance that Leonid Kuchma is counting on, after all, will depend to a significant extent on it. The foreign funds are extremely necessary to the president of Ukraine to support his new economic policy. In counting on that assistance, he also should not go visiting empty-handed. The greatest gift that Leonid Kuchma could hope to take with him to Washington would be the decision of the Supreme Council to ratify the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

The Ukrainian parliamentarians, however, bearing in mind last week's discussion of this document in the standing committees of the Supreme Council, have an equivocal attitude toward the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Assertions are heard quite often around Kiev that Ukraine will join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty only after it receives guarantees of its own security from the nuclear powers. But under those circumstances, we should address the apprehensions that were expressed by the first deputy chairman of the Supreme Council, Oleksandr Tkachenko: "In talking about guarantees of our national security, we do not want the nations that give those guarantees to alter the terms of the guarantees later." That means that Kiev will not be parting with its apprehensions. Even after the leaders of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Russia sign a multilateral treaty along the lines of the "four plus one," on which Kiev is insisting, Ukraine, after all, will at best have only a partial influence on the foreign policy and military concepts of the nuclear nations through that document.

With regard to Russia, for example, its military doctrine reserves for Russia the right to employ or threaten to employ nuclear weapons in the future as well. The multilateral security treaty that Ukraine plans to sign with the nuclear powers in December will scarcely be an important step forward for Kiev, compared to the guarantees that were defined in the Trilateral Declaration of the presidents of Ukraine, the United States, and Russia.

The state of Ukraine's economy, however, will be a much greater threat to its security than the absence or presence of nuclear weapons on its territory. This argument, however, while popular in the West, does not work in Ukraine. The reason is that Kiev will remain dissatisfied with the rate of receipt of American assistance for the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine in the future as well. Those funds will seep gradually through the "sieve" of American firms. Some people's deputies are stressing that the same fate could await the assistance promised by the West for the pursuit of economic transformations in Ukraine.

All of this provides grounds to assert that Ukraine's joining of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty will be reminiscent of the first attempt of the parliament to ratify START-I. Ukraine at that time advanced a whole series of restrictions, without which we will not be able to get by this time either. But it is one thing when Kiev insists on changes to the mechanism for the use of Western assistance for the requirements of disarmament or the right of ownership of nuclear weapons, and quite another matter when the discussion of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is concluded with the adoption of a resolution along the lines of that proposed by UNA-UNSO deputy Oleg Vitovich: "The Supreme Council removes this issue from discussion until there is an immediate global change in nuclear confrontation." Leonid Kuchma would then truly have to go to Washington without a gift in the form of a parliamentary decision on the non-nuclear status of Ukraine.

While this material was being prepared for press, an announcement was received that the Commission on Issues of Defense and State Security has again addressed this issue, and discussed in closed session information from the chairman of the commission, Volodymyr Mukhin, from expert evaluations pertaining to the positive and negative consequences if Ukraine should join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1 July 1968. The people's deputies, in the course of a principled and comprehensive analysis of the legal documents and expert materials submitted by the executive structures, resolved to continue the consideration of this issue at a session of the commission of November 15 of this year.

Post Cold War Attitudes Toward CFE, NATO

95UM0077C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
12 Nov 94 p 1

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA commentator Captain Serhiy Zhurets: "The 'War' Lost, the 'Window' Not Opened?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A press conference for domestic and foreign journalists by Supreme Council Chairman Oleksandr Moroz was devoted to the results of a visit by an official Ukrainian delegation to Belgium. Oleksandr Moroz emphasized that the principal aim of this trip was an attempt to open up a "window" to Europe. Well then, were they able to do so? What were the results of the visit and meetings of the Ukrainian delegation with the European parliament and the interparliamentary assemblies of the CFE and NATO?

Agreement was reached, in the opinion of the speaker, on a mutual acceleration of the ratification of a treaty between the European Community and Ukraine, while possibilities for granting Ukraine the status of a state with a transitional economy—which provides a series of concessions—were discussed. Oleksandr Moroz, however, for some reason decided not to focus the attention of the journalists on the fact that they had not been able to achieve the main thing—the granting of credit to Ukraine in the amount of 85 million ECUs—although the foreign information agencies had already had enough time to announce the "news." One reason for this failure could be considered the fact that they know more about us in the West, chiefly owing to nuclear weapons—the legacy of the former USSR. The Ukrainian delegation in Brussels had to convince the representatives of the European structures that Ukraine will not become an obstacle to the world on the question of joining the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The United States and Great Britain, indicated Oleksandr Moroz, have affirmed their intention of being guarantors of security for Ukraine, while France is already prepared to provide such guarantees directly.

Answering questions from journalists, Oleksandr Moroz indicated that the Ukrainian parliamentary delegation, during its visit to Belgium, proceeded from the fact that Ukraine is among those republics that lost the Cold War as part of the USSR.

"This is recognized around the world, by the way," said Oleksandr Oleksandrovich, "but the fact that the Cold War has ended has not brought stability to the world is also true. Our meetings in Brussels with the leader of the European Parliament, the head of the interparliamentary assembly of the CFE, and the Secretary General of NATO also took place in that context. We are a subject of international law today in the area of participants in the Cold War who actually lost. We should thus keep this in mind today as a given, as objective fact, and structure world policy with the aim of stability and harmony in the world in the future. The discussions with NATO were particularly interesting in that regard. It seems to me that the leaders of NATO have an understanding of some of our initiatives pertaining to local zones of peace, pertaining to the resolution of the problems of local conflicts, the use of armed forces and so forth. We had mutual understanding in that regard," said Oleksandr Moroz.

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Perceptions of Europe's Attitudes*95UM0077D Kiev SILSKI VISTI in Ukrainian
15 Nov 94 p 1*

[Article by N. Tsyupa: "Are We in Europe?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Even though the geographic center of Europe is located in Ukraine, many countries around the world need to be reminded that Ukraine is also a European nation. This was done once again by a delegation of the Supreme Council, headed by its chairman, to the Kingdom of Belgium. As O. Moroz stated at a press conference the other day, "We have been conscientiously opening up a window to Europe, and widening it as much as possible today." The idea was underscored in contacts and discussions at all levels that seeing Ukraine economically strong is in the interests of Europe and the world. The discussion concerned first and foremost not giving it material or financial assistance, but rather creating the standards base and conditions for businesslike cooperation and concrete collaboration.

The discussion at all meetings touched on the ratification of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The initiative of O. Moroz—to develop a new document that is more effective than the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty—was supported. That is although, in the opinion of the chairman of the Supreme Council, Ukraine will not be an obstacle to the extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty. Three standing commissions, for instance, have already reviewed this issue in a positive light. And its plenary discussion will have to be the same.

The European Parliament could also promote the allocation of material assistance for our nation building, but as delegation participant B. Oliynyk indicated, "It is surrounded with such a lasso of prior conditions that it cannot help but arouse astonishment...." One of them is the shutdown of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. This question will be raised again in the future, but O. Moroz considers it to be a purely internal one. He expressed the firm conviction that the plant will continue to function, there is no other way out for us. [passage omitted]

Recent events thus testify that Ukraine, although it is a European nation and the navel of our civilization, is rooted somewhere very far from that continent. Closer to those lands in which our countryman Myklukho-Maklay loved to journey.

Ukraine's Efforts To Comply With CFE Treaty Discussed*95UM0094A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
23 Nov 94 p 1*

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA commentator Serhiy Zhurets: "Surplus Weapons Being Cut Back in Ukraine, Flank Restrictions Remain"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *A briefing was held at the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine that was devoted to the*

participation of Ukraine in the Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] Treaty. The results of the completion of the second stage of that treaty, after all, have to be summarized on December 1.

Colonel Valeriy Belinskyy, who is taking the post of Deputy Chief of the Verification Center of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, took part in the briefing. This structure is occupied with inspection activity and monitoring the fulfillment of international treaties of, so to speak, military significance in the armed forces of Ukraine. These treaties include the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, as well as the Open Skies Treaty, which will soon have to be ratified by the Ukrainian parliament even though the preliminary period of that treaty is already underway. And, clearly, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. Ukraine, in accordance with that treaty, is to have a clearly defined list of conventional weaponry by 1995, with 4,080 tanks, 5,050 armored combat vehicles, 1,040 combat aircraft, 330 helicopters and 4,040 pieces of artillery.

Weaponry in excess of the stipulated levels is being cut back. In Ukraine this applies to aircraft, tanks and armored personnel carriers. As Colonel Valeriy Belinskyy indicated at the briefing, more than 60 percent of the excess weaponry—of that envisaged by the completion of the second stage of restrictions on the armed forces in Europe—has already been destroyed at Ukrainian enterprises. Foreign military inspectors, who have visited Ukraine quite often over the last two years, have confirmed that the methods of reducing the military hardware conform to international requirements. More than 200 inspection groups have visited Ukraine from various countries over that time, while Ukraine has been able to send at best only 20 percent of that number abroad for verifications. The reason, as the Ministry of Defense spokesman explained, is the traditional one—the lack of funds in the budget.

The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, it is true, entails more than cutbacks in weaponry alone; there are also restrictions on the basing of our armed forces in certain regions. The issue, as Colonel Valeriy Belinskyy emphasized, is the so-called flank regions. The flank region to which the Odessa Military District belongs occupies almost 23 percent of the territory of Ukraine. The Ministry of Defense may thus have only seven percent of the total number of its armored personnel carriers, nine percent of its tanks and twelve percent of its artillery pieces on virtually a quarter of its territory at the end of 1995, as envisaged by the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. The military feels that this disproportion will have a negative effect on guaranteeing security in that region. The Ministry of Defense is also convinced, for the same reasons, that agreement must be reached with the other participants in the treaty that Ukraine itself can determine how its own armed forces, already restricted by this treaty, will be stationed. The flank restrictions, after all, were created back during the confrontation of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The flank

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restrictions are discriminatory toward Ukraine since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Two consultations have already been held on this in Vienna with the participation of the General Staff of Ukraine, emphasized Colonel Valeriy Belinsky. The Ministry of Defense spokesman expressed the hope that these restrictions, discriminatory for Ukraine, will in time be lifted.

States' Black Sea Interests, Moves to Relax Tensions Discussed

95UM0094B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
24 Nov 94 p 1

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA commentator Captain Serhiy Zhurets under the rubric "Opinion": "Will the Black Sea Become a Peace Zone?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The attempts of official Kiev, which is swept from time to time with the idea of creating peace zones close to our own borders, is an entirely natural one considering the non-aligned and neutral position of Ukraine. The initiative of the first president of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, to create a security zone with the participation of a number of post-socialist European countries actually could not withstand the competition from the NATO "Partnership for Peace." Kiev is today emphasizing more and more often the necessity of transforming the Black Sea into a region of peace. A reduction in the level of military threat, a cutback in the burden of spending on the maintenance of naval fleets, and an improvement in the ecological situation could all be consequences of that. This could also have an effect, to a certain extent, on the prolonged and futile confrontation of Ukraine and Russia with regard to the fate of the Black Sea Fleet and the naval bases. The realization of this initiative, of course, depends on more than the desires of Ukraine; it also depends on the stances of the other countries of the Black Sea basin. Taking that into account, the question arises of whether Kiev will actually be able to implement its idea.

Ukraine, however, as was pointed out by Supreme Soviet Chairman Oleksandr Moroz, is still not discussing its practical realization, but rather only the idea itself of transforming the Black Sea into a peace zone. This envisages, in his opinion, a reduction in the amount of military forces in that region and the achievement of security guarantees for the countries that make up the Black Sea basin. This would have to be done on a legal and judicial basis.

Even though this initiative has yet to be discussed in the parliament of any of the countries in the Black Sea basin, Kiev has been able to get its idea even to the Secretary General of NATO, who Oleksandr Moroz emphasizes had a very positive reaction in reply.

The attitude of Russia toward the Ukrainian Black Sea proposal elicits particular interest under these circumstances. The deputy chairman of the State Duma of

Russia, Valentin Kovalev, indicated during a visit to Kiev, where there was a meeting of the PACHES bureau, "Russia supports the initiative of Ukraine with regard to the transformation of the Black Sea into a peace zone. This is our stance in principle." The main thing that Valentin Kovalev wanted to emphasize, however, we cite here: "As for the subsequent fate of the Black Sea fleet and the other military forces in that region, we must get the terminology straight. The substance we impart to a zone of peace must be defined. A peace zone does not envisage the absence of armed forces and the Black Sea Fleet, which in this case have significance as a factor of stability and security in the region."

These statements by Valentin Kovalev differ in no way from the statements that are made by Russian geopolitical figures most often today. Their trump card is the theme of pan-Islamism and the Muslim factor, the strengthened role and influence of Turkey in this region, and the impudent actions of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Black Sea, which may be opposed there only by an undivided Black Sea Fleet under Russian control.

It is also plain that the path of Kiev to the realization of the idea of remaking the Black Sea basin into a peace zone will hardly be an easy one.

Commentary on US Aid for Ukraine's Nuclear Disarmament

95UM0089B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
18 Nov 94 p 3

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA commentator Captain Serhiy Zhurets under the rubric "Nuclear Disarmament": "American Aid. For What Needs Is It Lacking?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The mass media, both Ukrainian and foreign, have quite often been discussing topics associated with the American aid for the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine. The discussion primarily concerns the fact that American financial and technical assistance directed toward those needs is coming too slowly. Is that indeed so, however?*

Recall that 185 million dollars are to be directed toward the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine under the Nunn-Lugar program. Those funds, it is expected in Washington, should be enough for Kiev so that Ukraine can fulfill its obligations under both the START-I treaty and the Trilateral Declaration of the presidents of Ukraine, the United States and Russia. The sending of nuclear warheads to Russia, as well as the destruction of missiles and missile launch silos, are what we are talking about. It is worth pointing out here, by the way, that 50 of the 185 million dollars proposed by the United States have a clearly defined purpose—to dismantle the 46 modern SS-24 solid-fuel missiles. This interest on the part of the West is entirely natural. People talk about what is bothering them, as they say. It could be pointed out, guided by the same approach, that we still have plenty of problems with the missiles that have already completed

their guaranteed service lives. The use of the 50 million also remains a matter, so to speak, for the long term. As for the rest, more precisely the American 135 million, Ukraine has already received hardware and equipment from the United States with an overall value of four million American dollars for the needs of nuclear disarmament. The United States has moreover already purchased the rest of the hardware and equipment, with a total value of 104 million dollars. That hardware is to be received by Ukraine in accordance with a delivery schedule coordinated earlier.

The reason for the dissatisfaction of Kiev is something else entirely. Close to four and a half thousand servicemen are being discharged from the ranks of the 43rd Missile Army with the destruction of the nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Half of them do not have their own housing. The former missile troops and the members of their families moreover need jobs as well as apartments. Incidentally, a significant portion of the funds are indeed being directed toward the resolution of social problems in accordance with the comprehensive program for the elimination of land- and air-based nuclear weapons. The representatives of the Ministry of Defense emphasize that Ukraine is not able to untangle this knot by itself, taking into account the poverty of the state coffers. According to preliminary estimates, after all, the creation of a job for a single serviceman discharged from the army would cost close to 125,000 American dollars, and his retraining another 20,000.

This problem, however, cannot be solved at the expense of the Nunn-Lugar program, which does not provide for those expenditures. This is owing to a restriction in Nunn-Lugar that does not permit this aid to be directed toward the resolution of the highly urgent problems for the strategic troops. That is precisely the circumstance that is bothering Kiev now. It is worth recalling here the statements of the chairman of the Commission of the Supreme Soviet on Issues of Nuclear Policy and Nuclear Security, Mykhaylo Pavlovskyy: "It turns out that the President, the government and the parliament not once advanced their own stipulations when the granting of financial assistance to us was being discussed. As a consequence, it sometimes happened that these countries financed primarily their own firms under the guise of assistance, creating new jobs for themselves and sending us only the finished product. And we just 'ate' it. We have now begun posing sharply the question of just what that assistance should be at the commissions of the Supreme Soviet." One should add to these words that the Western aid must be considered not as a benevolent act, but rather as natural and logical compensation for economic and military costs—including, to a certain extent, the increased social tensions among the missile servicemen.

Ukraine, under these circumstances, will try to get from Washington more active control over the funds for the resolution of the social problems that are the consequence of nuclear disarmament. And the construction of

two hundred cottages near Pervomaysk with the assistance of an American firm is not only the first step in that direction. The Ministry of Defense is also placing certain hopes for a speed-up of American aid for the resolution of social and ecological problems on the path of nuclear disarmament during the official visit of Leonid Kuchma to the United States.

INTERREGIONAL ISSUES

Principles for Joint CIS Military Security System

95UM0114A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 26 Nov 94 p 3

[Article by Colonel General Viktor Samsonov, chief of staff for the coordination of military cooperation of CIS member states: "Concerning the CIS Collective Security System; Problems and Prospects"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

The Commonwealth

In the Treaty on the Collective Security of Member States concluded on 15 May in Tashkent, member states declared their readiness to implement the right to collective defense and immediately to activate the mechanism for joint consultations to coordinate their positions and to adopt measures in the event of the appearance of a threat to the security, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of one or several member states.

The change in the military-political situation in the world, which is characterized by an easing of tensions on a global level, has nevertheless not led to the elimination of potential threats to the security, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of the member states of the Tashkent treaty. The complexity and contradictoriness of the national-historical, political, economic, social, military, and other processes in today's world are the reason for the existence of a military danger.

Therefore, the creation of a collective military security system seems necessary and urgent.

Such a system, in our view, must represent the aggregate of interstate and state organs, forces, and resources that ensure the defense of the vital interests of the treaty's member states on a legal basis with the support of military strength. Moreover, the main purpose in the functioning system of collective military security should be the guarantee of the military security of the member states owing to the support of a strategic equilibrium in the world and the region, and also the deterrence of other states from aggressive intentions.

In this connection, one of the priority tasks of the system of collective military security should be to expose sources of military danger and to predict the possibility of their developing into a military threat.

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To successfully prevent and repel aggression, it is necessary for member states already in peacetime to support the operational readiness of the armed forces at a high level and to ensure that such damage would be inflicted on an aggressor that would force him to abandon further armed conflict.

In this connection, it is extremely necessary to coordinate the military force structuring and training the armed forces to repel possible aggression, which, in turn, means the resolution of such tasks as the creation and perfection of strategic deployment systems, the coordination of measures for the creation of joint or combined reconnaissance, command and control, communications, warning, PVO [air defense] and other systems, perfection of the military infrastructure of member states, the coordination of troop (forces) training, and the coordination of measures for the preparation of the territories of the states to repulse aggression.

One of the methods of achieving the objectives of the creation of a system of collective military security, in our opinion, should be to support peace and stability in the member states by means of developing measures for barring the escalation of emerging contradictions into armed conflicts, and mechanisms for their prevention and settlement, and only in an extreme case through the employment of coalition peacekeeping forces.

Assistance in guaranteeing international stability and security is conditioned by the necessity to resolve tasks of cooperation with other regional security structures, and participation in the process of restoring peace and stability in zones of armed conflict beyond the borders of member states under the aegis of international organizations.

Tasks being resolved by the collective military security system do not give rise to sources of military danger and military threats to other states of the world, and, in this way, they also serve the cause of strengthening international global security.

The structure and common or similar principles for the creation and functioning of a collective military security system on the basis of a coalition military doctrine should promote the successful resolution of the enumerated tasks.

A coalition military doctrine, as presented, should be of a defensive nature, correspond to the current geostrategic situation, and ensure the defense of the vital interests of the member states, based on the common spiritual values of the people of the world.

No less significant is the principle of a coordinated approach to the resolution of questions for ensuring collective military security (the determination of strategic directions, the division of geostrategic space, the preparation of territories, and others), by which national interests are taken into account in the practice of establishing a collective military security system by all of the member states.

The guarantee of a collective military security system is possible owing to the use of both national and international organs, forces, and means that are established on the basis of the principle of a rational combination of centralized (intergovernment) and decentralized (national) command and control of forces and means within the framework of the system being established.

The member states in the treaty on collective security occupy a vast territory, and they border on states that pursue various military-political objectives. This leads to the fact that the military-political situation in various regions and, consequently, also the tasks of the member states in guaranteeing their own security, have important peculiarities. Under these conditions, it is expedient to conduct the establishment of a collective military security system on a regional basis, which gives the member states the sovereign right to guarantee their security, taking into account the geostrategic situation and maximum independence.

In the new geostrategic situation, the security of the states is indivisible. The realization of this requires the implementation of practical activity within the scope of the Treaty on Collective Security on the basis of the principle: **Aggression against one of the member states is considered aggression against all of them.**

The strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation, in our opinion, should be the major component of the collective security system and the basis of the nuclear might of the member states. Their task is to ensure a balance of forces and strategic stability, and to guarantee the security of all member states as a whole and of each state individually under any development in the military-political situation in the world.

As analysis of military threats and the practice of settling armed conflict shows, it is necessary to prepare troops (forces) for both local wars and conflicts and for a large-scale war, the probability of whose occurrence cannot be ruled out. Therefore, the structuring and preparation of armed forces in the future must be oriented on the resolution of these tasks. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that it is necessary to have sufficient forces for the resolution of tasks in a local war that is also concentrated in short periods. Wherever and whenever armed conflict or aggression breaks out, their elimination requires massive operations. This is corroborated by the experience of wars, including the Persian Gulf. Consequently, the basis of military force development in the system of collective military security should be the establishment of regular troops (forces) capable of resolving large-scale tasks.

In the capacity of forces and means of a collective military security system, it is advisable to examine:

the armed forces and the other troops of the member states,

coalition (combined) troops (forces),

joint (combined) systems (reconnaissance, monitoring outer space, PVO, and others).

The main tasks of repelling aggression and preventing and settling armed conflicts in the system of collective military security should be resolved by coalition troops.

While the establishment of national armed forces and other troops is an internal matter of the member states, the formation of coalition troops and combined systems of defense represents an interstate task and should be implemented within the framework of the formation of the collective security system.

Coalition Defense Forces (CDF) that are earmarked to repel aggression and to protect state borders, as we see it, should constitute the basis of coalition troops.

It is also advisable, in our view, to structure the CDF according to the **regional principle**. In accordance with it, a certain contingent of troops, who are part of the armed forces of member states in an established region, is transferred to the operational subordination of the regional command and control organ. The detached troops, which are operationally subordinate to the regional command, make up the **regional CDF**.

To preserve peace, prevent, and settle armed conflicts that break out in member states, it is advisable to establish, if necessary, **collective peacekeeping forces and groups of military observers**. Troops temporarily allotted by member states in an agreed number from the personnel of the national armed forces and who went through the necessary preliminary training can become part of the collective peacekeeping forces.

The preparation of forces and means of the collective military security system for the resolution of assigned tasks requires the conduct of operational planning for the CDF employment, collective peacekeeping forces, combined systems, coordination of numerical strength, preparation of the infrastructure of the regions, and the resolution of other tasks. This dictates the need to establish coalition military leadership organs in the collective military security system. In our opinion, both state and interstate organs established and being established that function on a permanent or temporary basis should be included in them.

Some interstate organs of the collective military security system have already been created, and they are the **Collective Security Council, the Council of Defense Ministers, and the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs**.

For the resolution of specific tasks of military organizational development and the provision of collective military defense, it is appropriate to establish coalition military command and control organs. As we see it, the following should be included as such organs: **Chiefs of Staff Committee, Combined Staff of Coalition Forces, Combined Command of Regional CDF, and other organs**.

The Chiefs of Staff Committee could constitute an organ of the Collective Security Council and the Council of Ministers of Defense on questions of structuring, training, and the employment of forces and means of the collective military security system and the conduct of a coordinated military-technical policy. It, in our opinion, should provide guidance for the development of operational plans for the employment of Coalition Forces, recommendations and proposals for their organizational development and increased operational and mobilization readiness, for preparing theaters of military operation, for the creation and accumulation of reserves of material resources, and to organize strategic cooperation, and to develop and present proposals on questions of collective military security of the member states of the Collective Security Treaty to the Collective Security Council and the Ministers of Defense Council.

Chiefs of the General (Main) Staffs of the Armed Forces of the member states should be members of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The duties of the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee should appropriately be entrusted to the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

The **combined staff of the Coalition Forces**, we think, should be a permanent working organ of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

It is appropriate to entrust to the Combined Staff of the Coalition Forces tasks for the study and estimate of the military-political situation, coordination of plans for the operational employment of Coalition Forces, organization and execution of peacekeeping operations, development of proposals on questions of force development, operational and mobilization readiness of the coalition forces, organization of theaters of military operations, accumulation of material resources, and also coordination with international organizations and security structures.

The Combined Staff of the Coalition Forces should conduct its activity in close coordination with the General (Main) Staffs of the Armed forces of the member states.

The **Combined Commands of the Regional Coalition Defense Forces** could become the organs of direct military command and control of the Coalition Defense Forces. They should be established on a coalition principle on the basis of national organs of the military command and control of the states of each specific region.

For the resolution of other tasks of providing collective military security, based on the developing military-political situation, **other organs of military command and control could be created**.

With the development and adoption of regulations that define the functioning of all elements of the system of collective military security, it is important to take into

account the specifics of their functioning in peacetime, when a military threat appears and under armed conflict conditions. It is necessary to take into account the peculiarities that occur in the event of large-scale aggression and a local war, inasmuch as under these conditions there is a change in the role, place, tasks, and sequence of the functioning of all of the components of the collective military security system, and this should be reflected in military force development.

It is advisable to implement the establishment of a collective military security system within the framework of a defense alliance in several stages. In the initial stage, it is important to complete the establishment of national armed forces and to develop and adopt a legal basis for the collective military security system. Then, in the next stage, to establish coalition organs of military command and control, coalition grouping of troops, and combined systems.

The collective military security system established within the framework of the treaty under conditions of a developing multipolar world will play a stabilizing role in the Commonwealth states and, functioning on UN principles, will be able to become a constituent part of the international security system. At the same time, cooperation with other regional international security structures on the principles of an equal rights partnership and under the aegis of the United Nations, or within the scope of the CSCE, will make it possible in the future to move to a more effective nonbloc system of international security.

The conclusion of the Tashkent treaty and the establishment on its basis of a collective military security system, in our opinion, conforms to the current geopolitical situation and, given the existing and emerging sources of military danger, will make it possible to guarantee the defense of the vital interests of the member states and to ensure their development.

OTHER STATES, REPUBLICS

Opposition Clashes in Chechnya

95UM0108A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Nov 94 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Anatoliy Mikhaylov: "The Russian Army Has Not Been a Party to the Bloodshed in Grozny. Politicians and Mercenaries Are Waging the Battles"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As is well known, on November 26 armed detachments of the opposition Chechnya Interim Council demonstrated the decisiveness of their intentions. Ruslan Labazanov attacked Grozny from the microrayon of Voykovo, Bislan Gantemirov's subunits entered the capital of Chechnya from the northeast, Umar Avturkhanov's group unleashed battles in Staropromyslovskiy Rayon, and a detachment from the village of Tolstoy-Yurt broke through to the central

square and to the Presidential Palace. According to various data, approximately 1,200 men, up to 30 armored vehicles, aircraft and helicopters from the opposition participated in the combat operations.

As always, the government and Interim Council press services reported extremely contradictory results of this operation. According to some data, subunits loyal to President Dzhokhar Dudayev retreated with heavy battles from the center of Grozny and its southern outskirts toward the microrayon of Mikutka, and we can consider the storming of the city to be completed as a result. According to other information, Dzhokhar Dudayev has not left his residence and was only compelled to relocate to an underground command post. Opposition troops have been dispersed and routed detachments have retreated to the areas of Znamenskoye and Tolstoy-Yurt...

Somehow or other, Dzhokhar Dudayev's assurances that the capital is well reinforced and that opposition subunits will not penetrate the defenses have, putting it mildly, not been confirmed. In order to at least somehow justify the defeat to his comrades-in-arms and present Russia as a bloodthirsty invader. For the umpteenth time, Dzhokhar Dudayev has brought to light a forgery about the participation of Russian Army regular units in combat operations.

Chechnya Presidential Press Service Chief Khasim Raduyev and later General Dzhokhar Dudayev himself set forth their version of who and how Grozny was attacked last Saturday. According to their words, as "Ekho Moskv" Information Agency transmitted them, a nearly 4,000-man Russian troop formation "with the utilization of two battalions of the Kantemirovka Tank Division, the officer corps of the Taman Division, 15 combat helicopters, and two squadrons of Su-27 ground attack aircraft attempted to storm Grozny, however, this attempt completely collapsed... More than 200 Russian servicemen were taken prisoner. As evidence of these, let's state it frankly, numbers that thrill the spirit of an uninitiated person who poorly investigates military issues, they presented one of the "Russian servicemen" to the television viewers.

As for the name of this "Kantemirovka Division member", the Ground Forces press center explained: That soldier actually did serve in a Moscow Military District unit but not in the Kantemirovka or Taman. He was already released in the spring of 1994.

There is reliable information with regard to the other "199 Russian Army servicemen" taken prisoner—we have learned that young Russian lads were forcibly seized in Grozny and they have been dressed in the uniforms of Russian soldiers. It's easy to guess what they can testify if you put an assault rifle to their backs...

Meanwhile, the information agency is transmitting that the situation in Grozny practically normalized on the morning of November 28. Insignificant exchanges of fire

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are flaring up only on the outskirts of the city. According to Dzhokhar Dudayev's statement, the services are working round the clock to restore the city utilities that were destroyed during the course of the November 26 battles. Information on Ruslan Khasbulatov's speech on local radio has arrived from the opposition camp. He warned the population of Grozny that children need to be evacuated from the city as soon as possible in connection with the bombing of the capital of Chechnya in the next few days.

The war and struggle for power continue by any accessible means.

Yeltsin Gives Chechens 48 Hours to End Violence

95UM0108B Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 30 Nov 94 p 1

[Appeal by Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin, 29 November 1994, 0800: "The Russian President Has Given the Participants of the Conflict in Chechnya 48 Hours To Stop the Bloodshed: The Russian Federation President's Appeal to the Participants of the Armed Conflict in the Chechen Republic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Blood is being spilled on ancient Caucasian soil that is an inalienable part of our Fatherland.

Despite all of the efforts of the federal organs of state power and of the authoritative elders and leaders of the peoples who live here in the North Caucasus, the appeals of the Russian and world community to cease the internal conflict in Chechnya have not succeeded. The scale is increasing and the ferocity of the armed clashes is increasing. The opposing sides are appealing for the participation of mercenaries in combat operations, including from foreign states.

Innocent people are dying because of irresponsible politicians, for the sake of their own selfish interests and unquenchable ambitions. The number of orphans is multiplying. Citizens' constitutional rights and freedoms are being flaunted. Thousands of indigents are being transformed into refugees, they are being deprived of shelter and are being compelled to leave the graves of their ancestors. Grief, suffering and fear before outrageous crime and rampant banditry are poisoning the lives of the Chechen people and their neighbors.

The situation is acquiring a nature that is extremely dangerous for stability and peace in our society and for Russia's vitally important interests and national security. I, as the President of Russia, have the responsibility for its fate and for the lives and health of all of its citizens. Expressing the will of our multinational people and in accordance with the powers which have been given to me by the Russian Federation Constitution and Article 7 of the Law "On a State of Emergency", I appeal to all participants of the armed confrontation in the Chechen Republic with a warning and demand to cease fire, lay down your arms, disband all armed formations,

and release all imprisoned and forcibly detained citizens within 48 hours from the moment of my appeal.

If these demands have not been met within the prescribed time period, a state of emergency will be introduced on the territory of the Chechen Republic with the utilization of all men and equipment that the state has at its disposal to stop the bloodshed and protect the lives, rights and freedoms of Russian citizens and restore a constitutional regime, law and order and peace in the Chechen Republic.

[Signed] B. Yeltsin
November 29, 1994.
6 o'clock

For some time, it's as if we have forgotten that Chechnya is part of the Russian State. Now the president has decisively reminded us of that, including those who persist in attaining their goals in Chechnya. And they actually should not be so persistent. We can judge that based upon the news arriving from there. RIA reported that at the present time Interim Council troops control part of the city's outskirts after the unsuccessful attempt to seize Grozny.

Four jet aircraft conducted a missile-bomb strike at 15:10 Moscow time against the central portion of Grozny where a rally of Dzhokhar Dudayev's proponents had been conducted since morning. A Chechen Press Agency associate reported that to an ITAR-TASS correspondent by telephone.

The Chechen airport has also been under fire. One of the attacking aircraft was shot down and fell near the airport.

Chechnya Armed Forces Main Headquarters categorically refuted reports that had appeared in some of the mass media that the shooting of prisoners had begun in Grozny. According to a headquarters official statement, not one of the more than 200 prisoners has been shot, a separate investigation will be conducted on each of them and a military tribunal will hand down a verdict.

Meanwhile, the names of Russian citizens who are prisoners in Grozny have reached the State Duma Defense and Security Committee. Let's list several here: Aleksandr Danilov, Yevgeniy Zhukov, Vladimir Drozdov, and Andrey Kryukov. So far, Committee workers have managed to investigate three of them in detail. It turned out that none of them serves in the Russian Army.

On November 29, Colonel-General Anatoliy Kulikov, Deputy Internal Affairs Minister and RF MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Internal Troops Commander-in-Chief, met with journalists. While answering their numerous questions with regard to the situation in Chechnya, Kulikov said that internal troops operational

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subunits and local forces of law enforcement organs have been on the border with Chechnya since August of this year and the conflict has not spread beyond the republic's borders largely thanks to them. Speaking about the possible introduction of internal troops into Chechnya, Colonel-General Kulikov noted that the Internal Troops,

like all force structures, will carry out the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and, if a decision on activation of the troops is made, Russian MVD Internal Troops soldiers and officers will become involved with professional missions to support the state of emergency regime.

ARMS TRADE

Russia To Sign Agreement as Arms Supplier to Gulf Countries

95UM0092A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 19 Nov 94 p 4

[Article by Svetlana Sukhova: "Russia Intends To Contend With the United States in the Arab Markets—Viktor Chernomyrdin's Visit to the Middle East"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Viktor Chernomyrdin's trip to the Arabian Peninsula, which began today, is noteworthy for a number of reasons. In the first place, this is the first visit to the Middle East on this level since 1990. In the second place, the countries chosen to visit are not those that formerly were major economic partners or political allies of the USSR and Russia. On the contrary, Kuwait, the UAE [United Arab Emirates], Saudi Arabia, and the Sultanate of Oman are a zone of American military and commercial interests. There are no large installations built with assistance from Moscow in them as there are, for example, in Egypt or Iraq, and the level of trade with Russia could be better. But Chernomyrdin intends not only to sign agreements on trade-economic cooperation with the Arabian countries but also to discuss questions of exporting Russian military hardware.

Beginning in the 1960s and all the way until 1990 the countries of the Middle East were the USSR's main partners among the developing states (they accounted for about 30 percent of USSR trade, up to 6.5-7 billion dollars a year). Deliveries from this region substantially covered the USSR's petroleum requirement (Arab petroleum was used for re-export to India, Cuba, and the Eastern European countries). In addition, the Middle East was a good market for sale of Soviet machinery and equipment. And using the money obtained from the unbalanced trade, Moscow bought American grain and consumer goods, and also granted credit to the same Middle Eastern states.

In the early 1980s, with the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Israel, a certain decline occurred in trade relations with the Arab countries. The Iraqi aggression against Kuwait in 1990 did not have the best impact on Russian-Arab trade relations either—Saddam Husayn's army was supplied with Soviet equipment. The direct loss for the USSR then was about 8-10 million dollars. It was at precisely this time that the channel of Russian arms deliveries to this region was almost completely blocked off. Even today Moscow does not consider all the countries of the Middle East equally promising for cooperation. Moscow has bet on Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE, Kuwait, and Oman. And two cooperation programs have already been prepared: Russia-Saudi Arabia, and Russia-Arab Monarchies. During negotiations consideration will be given to such factors as the political inertia and firmness of the emirate houses, on the one hand, and the economic difficulties in Russia which do not give it the right to figure on broad

military-technical cooperation, on the other. Moscow's interests are so significant that it has risked storming at least part of the region despite a certain irritation in Washington. In the opinion of Russian military specialists, the most promising area of trade is aircraft: the emirs showed an interest in the Ka-50 and Mi-17 helicopters at the military salons in Farnborough and Dubai.

More than 65 percent of world arms export today is concentrated in six countries: Iraq (until 1990 it spent about 6 billion dollars a year on arms purchases), Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Syria. Until early 1992 the USSR was rightly considered the number one arms supplier in this region; in 1990-1992 it sold 24 billion dollars worth of arms. But in early 1993 export decreased. They say that during Chernomyrdin's visit to the Middle East agreement may be reached with the UAE to deliver Russian armored equipment in exchange for granting of Arab credit to Moscow and joint financing of petroleum projects.

As for nonmilitary business, the prospects are less impressive. Trade and economic cooperation has been reduced almost to zero (about 30 small and medium-sized companies are taking the risk of delivering goods to Russia). People in Moscow, however, consider the situation curable. The grounds for this are the territorial proximity of the Arab East, the key place of this region in the world fuel-energy balance, the petrodollar wealth of the region, and therefore the possibility of large infusions of investment in the Russian economy. Trade today is developing most successfully with the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Cooperation with Kuwait and the Saudi development funds, which grant loans on more favorable conditions than Western creditors, also looks promising. With help from Middle Eastern banks it would be possible to begin repaying debts to the former USSR, especially when ways to solve this problem have already been worked out at the International Bank for Economic Cooperation.

According to information from the Russian Government, an agreement on trade-economic and technical cooperation with Saudi Arabia and an agreement on trade-economic cooperation with the UAE, Oman, and Kuwait are to be signed during the visit. Four additional agreements in the spheres of trade, culture, and information exchange are also to be signed with Kuwait. The Russian prime minister intends to devote special attention to the issues of settling Moscow's indebtedness to Kuwait, which exceeds 1 billion dollars.

Deliveries of Soviet Arms to Middle Eastern Countries in 1979-1983 (according to information from Western special services)

The total volume of deliveries was 19.76 billion dollars. Of this 0.4 billion worth of arms was sold to Egypt, 7.2 billion to Iraq, 0.23 billion to Jordan, 0.03 billion to

Kuwait, 9.2 billion to Syria, 1.2 billion to the Yemen Arab Republic, and 1.5 billion to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

The primary suppliers of arms to the Middle East until recently were: USSR—27.3 percent, United States—26.7 percent, France—12 percent, Great Britain—9 percent, and China—5.8 percent.

Indebtedness of Middle Eastern Countries to Russia

The total debt is 30 billion dollars. The largest debtors are: Syria—11 billion, Iraq—5.5 billion, Egypt—about 3 billion (last week Vice Premier Oleg Davydov signed a "zero option" solution to this problem in Cairo), and Libya and Yemen—2.5 billion each.

Table 1. Dynamics of Military Deliveries to the Middle East in 1975-1990

| Year | Tanks and Armored Personnel Carriers | Artillery and Missiles | Airplanes | Warships |
|------|--------------------------------------|------------------------|-----------|----------|
| 1975 | 22,850 | 18,137 | 2,265 | 436 |
| 1990 | 40,679 | 37,199 | 4,194 | 814 |

Table 2. Russian Trade with Countries of the Arabian Peninsula in 1992 (in billions of dollars)

| Category | Kuwait | UAE | Oman | Saudi Arabia |
|----------|--------|-------|------|--------------|
| Export | 1.3 | 112.8 | 1.8 | 22.4 |
| Import | 0.2 | 19.4 | 0 | 0.1 |
| Trade | 1.5 | 132.2 | 1.8 | 22.5 |

Table 3. Armament of the Countries of the Arabian Peninsula

| Country | Armed Forces (personnel) | Tanks | Armored Reconnaissance Vehicles and Personnel Carriers | Aircraft | Ships |
|--------------|--------------------------|-------|--|----------|-------|
| Kuwait | 11,700 | 200 | 70 | 36 | 4 |
| Oman | 35,700 | 121 | 28 | 62 | 12 |
| Saudi Arabia | 102,000 | 700 | 2,620 | 293 | 37 |
| UAE | 54,500 | 207 | 595 | 124 | 19 |

Table 4. Economic Potential of the Countries of the Arabian Peninsula

| Country | Gross Domestic Product (billions of dollars) | | Income Growth (percentage) | | Military Expenditures (billions of dollars) | | Foreign Debt (billions of dollars) |
|--------------|--|-------|----------------------------|------|---|------|------------------------------------|
| | 1991 | 1992 | 1991 | 1992 | 1991 | 1992 | |
| Kuwait | 26.2 | 28.4 | 40 | 45 | 16.8 | 9.3 | 13 |
| Oman | 12.1 | 13.6 | 9.1 | 7.0 | 1.49 | 1.73 | 2.9 |
| Saudi Arabia | 105.2 | 112.7 | 6.6 | 5.4 | 23.2 | 35.5 | 29.1 |
| UAE | 33.6 | 33.7 | -2 | -1 | 4.9 | 5.2 | 10.7 |

Belarus Vetoes Sale of S-300PMU

95UM0109A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Nov 94 p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Valeri Kovalev, Minsk: "The President of Belorussia Has Vetoes The Sale of a Missile System: This Scandal Broke Out in Minsk After the Appearance in IZVESTIYA of the Article 'Russia's Military Secrets Can Be Sold in Minsk'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] This was a question of Belorussia's intention to sell an S 300 PMU air defense missile

system abroad for \$500 million through the American-Canadian firm A.T.O.S. In the newspaper's opinion, the planned deal could inflict appreciable damage to Russia since it would reveal its military secrets.

All last week, the Belorussian press conducted a lively commentary on this report. Some newspapers upbraided the firm "Beltekhexport" for the incorrectness of the deal and others asserted that nothing terrible had occurred because the system, around which passions had flared, is not a secret since Russia itself sells it abroad.

Belorussian President Aleksandr Lukashenko brought clarity to this issue. In a ZVYAZDA newspaper interview, he assessed the sensation raised in the mass media

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with regard to the sale of the air defense missile system as a provocation. First of all, stated the head of the Belorussian state, take the absurd sum of \$500 million that had been cited in IZVESTIYA. A figure of a little over \$6 million appears in the contract signed on 1 July 1994. Second, this system "would already have been sold long ago if not for Lukashenko". "I could not sell it even if I wanted to," said the president. "This is a secret system made by Russia with Belorussia's participation. And if we want to trade rationally, we need to jointly carry out these steps. Therefore, I terminated fulfillment of the contract, although they insistently spur me on: 'We must sell it.' We will sort out who has a personal interest here", promised Aleksandr Lukashenko.

That Minsk in no way intends to sell Russian military secrets clearly proceeds from the Belorussian president's words. Here they assess the uproar raised surrounding the missile system as an attempt of certain political forces to complicate Russian-Belorussian relations at that moment when work on a treaty on friendship and cooperation between the two fraternal countries is nearing completion.

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Review of U.S. Military Policy, Budget for 1995

95UM0097A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 17 Nov 94 p 5

[Article by expert group of the Defense Enterprise Assistance League: "Expert Assessment: U.S. Defense Policy Review—Certain Features of U.S. Defense Department's Budget for 1995 Fiscal Year"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In October 1993, the U.S. Defense Department completed a fundamental "bottom-up" review of the structure of its Armed Forces and a reassessment of basic programs for the development of weapons systems. The review, according to former U.S. Defense Secretary Les Aspin, was prompted by the changes that have occurred in the world since The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

In order to counter potential threats that could arise in connection with destabilization in various parts of the world and the emergence of new countries possessing nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction, the United States must have sufficient military power and capability to field the best-equipped military forces in the world. They must be able to ensure an expanded American presence abroad, effective deterrence of potential aggressors, the successful conduct of operations in two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts, and participation in UN international operations.

In this connection, the objectives and missions of the U.S. Armed Forces can be summarized as follows:

- to prevent the use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons against the United States and its Armed Forces and allies;
- to stop or contain the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons;
- to promote the detection and elimination of weapons of mass destruction at bases and storage and production facilities, to track redeployments of such weapons, and to protect its forward-based forces against such weapons;
- to continue to reduce the nuclear arsenals of the former Soviet Union and the United States and thus to lessen the threat of nuclear war;
- to minimize the effect of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons on American forces;
- to be prepared to respond to new threats from countries in various regions and to use available opportunities to limit these threats, which requires that aggressive forces be deterred, or, if this fails, that they be defeated in regions of the greatest importance to the United States;
- to prepare the U.S. Armed Forces to force an adversary to turn to peaceful means and to participate in multilateral negotiations; if this cannot be done, they must be capable of mounting a unilateral operation against that adversary.

Priorities in Armed Forces Development and Review of Key Military Programs in the Period Up to 2000

- the development of smaller but qualitatively new military forces that are capable of maintaining a high level of combat-readiness for a sustained period of time;
- the retention of highly skilled military and civilian personnel;
- the consolidation of the National Guard and reserve forces;
- the equipment of forces with high-tech weaponry and combat hardware;
- the formulation of a consolidated program for the development of promising offensive weapon technologies (JAST);
- the reorientation of the SDI program toward the protection of theater groups of forces from missile strikes, and the development of a national ground-based ABM system.

The review of American defense policy, in the opinion of President Bill Clinton, will demonstrate to allies, friends, and potential adversaries that the United States is a world leader and that it does not intend to forgo its presence in all regions of the world. Clinton has declared that the U.S. Armed Forces should be the best-trained and best-armed and capable of mounting operations under any conditions.

In accordance with the fundamental review of areas of the development of the Armed Forces and military programs in 1995-1999, plans call for reducing:

- the Army: to 10 regular and five reserve divisions. (There are currently 14 regular and six reserve divisions.);
- the Navy: aircraft carriers to 11 and one in reserve (there are currently 12); submarines to 45, and ships of various classes to 346;
- the Air Force: the number of air wings from 16 to 13, and the number of reserve wings from 12 to seven;
- plans call for a substantial reduction in strategic forces, in accordance with the START I and START II agreements.

The number of nuclear submarines is to be reduced from 34 to 18, strategic bombers from 301 to 104, and ballistic missiles from 787 to 500. The strength of the Marine Corps will be cut to 174,000 men by 1997.

The total strength of the U.S. Armed Forces is to be 1.4 million men by 1997.

Plans call for shutting down the program for the production of the F-16 (after 1994), the F-18C/D (after 1997), the MRS (a multipurpose fighter), the A-6 (an attack airplane), the AF/X (a prospective attack airplane), and the EA-6B (an electronic warfare airplane).

Infrastructure will undergo partial reductions (missile bases, airfields, radar stations, and other installations).

Planned U.S. Military Appropriations in 1995-1999 Fiscal Years

Before President Clinton came to power, military appropriations for 1995-1999 were planned at \$1.325 trillion. With Clinton's presidency, these appropriations will be cut by \$109 billion. This is to be achieved through the following steps:

- a reduction for the Armed Forces: \$24 billion;
- a reduction for infrastructure: \$19 billion;
- a reduction in programs for ballistic missile development: \$21 billion;
- modernization of certain types of weapons and a reduction in capital investments: \$32 billion.

Total reductions will amount to \$96 billion, allowing for an appropriation of \$5 billion for aid to the former Soviet republics and for peacekeeping operations; the remaining \$13 billion will be in the form of savings from procurement program reforms and a review and possible reduction in the budget for strategic and other programs.

The proposal for the makeup of the U.S. Armed Forces in 1999 and breakdown of quantities of military hardware are given below:

Army:

- 10 regular divisions and five reserve divisions;

Navy:

- 11 aircraft carriers (in the active fleet);
- one aircraft carrier (reserve);
- 45-55 offensive submarines;
- 346 ships of various classes;

Air Force:

- 13 air wings (regular);
- seven fighter wings (reserve)
- 180 bombers (B-2, B-1, B-52);

Marine Corps:

- three expeditionary units;
- 174,000 personnel (regular);
- 42,000 reserve personnel;

Strategic Nuclear Forces:

- 18 missile submarines;
- 94 B-52H bombers;
- 20 B-2 bombers;
- 500 single-warhead Minuteman strategic missiles.

Structure of U.S. Military Budget for 1995 Fiscal Year

The military budget proposed by the defense secretary for the 1995 fiscal year reflects the first steps being taken to implement the recommendations resulting from the bottom-up review of defense programs.

Of total federal appropriations for the 1995 fiscal year (\$1.3538 trillion), \$263.7 billion (in current prices) is being requested for military purposes, including:

- the Defense Department: \$252.2 billion;
- the Energy Department: \$10.6 billion for military programs;
- other agencies: \$.9 billion for military programs.

The requested funding for arms procurement (\$43.3 billion) is \$1.2 billion less than the appropriations for this purpose in the 1994 fiscal year (\$44.5 billion).

The request for appropriations for research and development is \$36.2 billion, or \$1.4 billion more than in the 1994 fiscal year (\$34.8 billion). This reflects an effort to give priority to research and development in the 1995 fiscal year in order to maintain U.S. technical superiority in the long term. This request is in keeping with the relatively constant level of appropriations for research and development with adjustments for inflation.

Appropriations for military training and material and equipment supply are up \$4.9 billion from the 1994 fiscal year. Defense Secretary William Perry has said that the increase in appropriations for this line item is quite deliberate and intended to maintain military forces of reduced strength "in a state of high combat readiness."

The Clinton Administration has also decided to take a certain risk in eliminating or postponing certain programs for modernizing military equipment, hoping to use the reserves formed from the arms buildup during the tenure of President Ronald Reagan. Efforts will be aimed at improving existing systems and lending them the "capability to perform their functions with an efficiency an order or more higher than the starting level. This can be achieved through the sensible use of new-generation information technologies."

Total budget appropriations for the development of defenses against ballistic missiles in the Defense Department's budget for the 1995 fiscal year will increase from \$2.74 billion in 1994 to \$3.25 billion in the 1995 fiscal year; a large portion of these funds will be used to finance efforts in the field of theater ABM systems. The largest one-time increase in appropriations will be for the Patriot/ERINT program, in the amount of approximately \$260 million, and total spending on this system will be nearly \$600 million.

The budget for the 1995 fiscal year provides for the appropriation of \$41.5 million for the Talon Shield program and other programs in the Talon series for developing systems to transmit intelligence data obtained from satellites and other sources to fighters,

bombers, and search-and-rescue airplanes and helicopters. More than \$38.4 million is to be appropriated for manned aircraft for suppressing enemy air defense installations.

—\$2.46 billion for research and development of the F-22 fighter, designed for winning air superiority;

—\$648 million for the Milstar system of military communications satellites;

—\$408 million for the production of three B-2 strategic bombers.

The Army plans to spend \$1.04 billion to buy the RAN-66 and UH-60 helicopters; \$122 million to buy 830 Hellfire air to surface missiles; and \$116 million to purchase 148 ATACMS surface to surface missiles, and other systems.

Under the proposed 1995 budget for the U.S. Armed Forces, funding for purchases of airplanes and helicopters will be cut to \$4.8 billion, as against \$5.6 billion in the 1994 fiscal year. However, funding for purchases will begin to increase in 1987, when the Navy starts buying the F/A-18 E/F and V-22 airplanes.

The U.S. Armed Forces' proposed budget for the 1995 fiscal year contains a sizable increase for research and development under the program for developing the V-22 airplane—to \$496.9 million, compared to \$9.7 million in 1994.

The Marine Corps plans to buy 425 V-22 airplanes. Nearly \$2 billion will be spent for this purpose through 1999.

A breakdown of appropriations for the Defense Department's basic programs is set forth in the following table.

Defense Department Appropriations for Basic Programs in 1993-1995 Fiscal Years
(in billions of dollars and current prices)

| Basic Defense Department Programs | 1993 fiscal year (actual) | 1994 fiscal year (approved) | 1995 fiscal year (requested) |
|--|---------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
| Personnel | 76.0 | 70.8 | 70.5 |
| Combat Training and Material and Equipment Supply | 89.2 | 88.0 | 92.9 |
| Procurement of Weapons and Combat Hardware | 52.8 | 44.5 | 43.3 |
| Research and Development | 37.8 | 34.8 | 36.2 |
| Military Construction | 4.6 | 6.0 | 5.1 |
| Housing Construction | 3.9 | 3.5 | 3.3 |
| Other Programs | 3.0 | 1.5 | 0.9 |
| Total Defense Department Appropriations for 1993-1995 Fiscal Years | 267.2 | 249.0 | 252.2 |

In connection with the enormous changes that have occurred in the world, above all the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the American

leadership adopted a decision in late 1993 to fundamentally review the structure of its Armed Forces and to reevaluate the basic programs for weapons system development.

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The intention is to create smaller but qualitatively new forces that are mobile, equipped with high-tech weapons and combat hardware, and capable of conducting operations in any region and under any conditions. In addition to upgrading existing weapons systems, the Defense Department continues to invest funds in the development of new-generation highly accurate weapons systems and intelligence systems, to increase its air- and sea-lift capability, to bolster the offensive capability of the Air Force, Navy, and Army, and to develop a system to protect against ballistic missiles in theaters of military operations.

The proposed defense budget provides for appropriations for the development of next-generation weapons systems, as well as for the maintenance of key industrial sectors.

One of the most important features of the future budget, in the view of Defense Secretary William Perry, is its "reorientation" of the program for the development of missile defense systems for theaters of military operations and its support for a strong intelligence program.

SECURITY SERVICES

Border Troops Destroy Tajik Opposition Arms Cache

95UM0080D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 15 Nov 94 p 1

[Item from Dushanbe: "Unlucky" Number for the Opposition"]

[FBIS Translated Text] ITAR-TASS—A major secret cache of ammunition for mortars, grenade launchers and small arms belonging to the Tajik opposition was destroyed on 13 November by Russian border troops in the Moscow Border Detachment 12th Outpost sector.

The operational situation in other sectors of the Tajik-Afghan border remains tense. Border troops of the Pyandzh Border Detachment 11th Outpost discovered a group of armed intruders crossing the border river Pyandzh from Afghanistan into Tajikistan on 13 November. Seven intruders were killed in the course of a brief battle; there were no losses among the Russian border troops.

Problems of Border Troops in Northwestern Border District Viewed

95UM0103A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 23 Nov 94 pp 1, 3

[Article by Liana Minasyan: "Yeltsin Will Sense the 'Breathing of the Border': Creating Frontier Outposts in Northwestern Russia Will Cost R150 Billion"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Establishment of each new border outpost costs Russian taxpayers R4-5 billion.

And Russia's new boundary stretches 60,900 kilometers—along the North Caucasus and along borders with Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltics. It is as long the former Soviet border, but far from all of it will be locked up and patrolled: The better part of the border will remain transparent, and Russia intends to set up a state border of the classical model only with the Baltic countries. And as Northwestern Border District commander Vladimir Vyunov said, creation of another 26 outposts here will require R150 billion. This is because when they left the former border, the border troops left around 40 percent of their facilities behind. This district is responsible for protecting over 2,000 km of borders with Finland, Estonia and Latvia. The commander believes the situation on the Finnish border to be fully stable (colleagues are exchanging experience), but as far as the other two neighbors are concerned, territorial disputes and problems with smugglers give him trouble.

The Kingisepp Border Detachment left the Estonian islands of Saaremaa and Hiiumaa, and 2 years ago, in November 1992, it established itself in a new place—in Leningrad Oblast. It is responsible for around 80 km of the Russian-Estonian border along the Narva River, the Gulf of Finland and the Narva Reservoir. The section protected by the detachment is associated with territory upon which Estonia is pressing a claim on the basis of the 1920 Tartu Treaty—on 727 square kilometers, from 5 to 20 km from the Russian border. To be specific, in formal terms this is only the Russian border, since Estonia calls it a "temporary control line." Russia began marking its own border unilaterally on the basis of the June presidential edict, and this process should be finished by December 31. One hundred forty-four reinforced concrete red-and-green border posts were already installed in the ground on the territory of the Kingisepp detachment. Of course, plates bearing the national emblem have been cast for only two of these posts (by the way, each post has another functional part—a sharp metal pin on its top, to keep birds from landing and damaging state property). Neither electronic warning systems nor other barricading measures have been foreseen here—only the border details. Nonetheless, the legal status of the border has not yet been determined, and the talks are not going well.

The "Ivangorod" frontier outpost is considered to be a "lively place" among smugglers: Over 80 percent of the border violations occur there. The outpost commander, Major Vladimir Chornyy, explains this by saying that this is a difficult section for his border troops to patrol, and it is tempting to smugglers: The stream bed is dry, the entire operation takes 20 minutes, and it can be abandoned quickly. As a rule they find a guide from among the locals, and according to border troops many local inhabitants on both sides of the border managed to get rich at this enterprise while the border was "transparent." In 1 year the outpost was able to interdict crossings of 4 tonnes of nonferrous metals from Russia. As the border troops intensified their control, small-time smugglers quit the business, such that a few die-hards remain. In the opposite direction, weapons are being

imported illegally into Russia. The prices in the arms market are higher here. Drugs cross through Russia and Estonia in transit to Western Europe. There is one other problem—illegal emigrants from third countries. This year the outpost detained 14 persons with forged passports, 8 of them Kurds attempting to make their way to Sweden. According to the stories, the guide offered \$200 for each one of them, but the sergeant, who was in the service on a contract with wages of R140,000, remained faithful to his duty. It was reported that he was nominated for a decoration. By the way, the amount of offered bribes has even reached up to \$20,000 (in that instance, border troops detained a large consignment of metal appraised at twice that amount). The Estonians also created a group to combat unlawful circulation of weapons and drugs and illegal emigration, but Russian border troops assert that they turn a blind eye to smuggling of nonferrous metals.

In turn, Nadim Iskhakov, chief of the "Ivangorod" border checkpoint department (he controls the border checkpoints) reported that his border troops detained contraband worth half a billion rubles just this year. The now-busy border crossing between Ivangorod and Narva is used by around 12,000 persons daily, and in a year over a million persons have crossed the border. There is a simplified crossing procedure in place here—by an arrangement between the administrations of the two cities. Those who carry local registry papers can travel to the Estonian side, while those who have kept their red Soviet passports can travel to the Russian side.

Many local inhabitants possess property or work on the other side, and utilities of Ivangorod are still tied in with Narva's: Electric power is obtained from across the border on one side, and gas is supplied in the other direction. Consequently there is a difference in the city in the prices of "imported" and local electricity. Many would prefer to go to Estonia for meat and to Russia for bread, but the Estonians raised customs duties on food, and the flow trickled to a halt. Little by little, city residents are getting used to the new situation, though many of Narva's citizens hastened to move to Russia. Narva's better-off residents prefer Estonian well-being, while the poorer citizens prefer the relatively lower cost of Russian goods and services, and obviously citizenship will be an important problem for a long time to come. The current procedures for crossing the border may remain only up until next year—the easy-access checkpoints are inconsistent with the standards of international law, and for practical purposes they are illegal. For the time being, "Life compels us to keep them open," says Lieutenant General Vyunov.

In the meantime the economy of the border oblasts continues to be closely associated with Estonia. The bulk of commodity turnover with it consists of deliveries of Russian fuel, but Pskov Oblast, which we might refer to as "continental," obtains all of its electric power from abroad—a third from Belarus and two-thirds from Estonia. Latvia and Estonia hold first place here in capital investments. Such that the "breathing of the border" can be sensed, and local authorities will tell President Yeltsin so when he comes to Pskov to inspect life at the border.

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